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Executive Summary 
 
The European Commission launched a review process of Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS), the 
conclusions of which were disseminated via a formal Communication in 2006. The Commission highlighted a number of 
short-term improvements to the existing arrangements, to be adopted via self-regulatory agreements, without changes in the 
existing legislation. The European Forum of Deposits Insurers (EFDI) was asked to assist the Commission and its Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) in addressing these self regulatory issues. Several Working Groups have been set-up to deal with 
each theme. In its Communication, the Commission also identified the necessity to focus on the efficiency of current EU 
DGS when faced with a need to reimburse depositors.  
This Report considers the various meanings the word “efficiency” can have, the current way DGS operate, and a 
quantitative analysis investigating the capability of the EU Member States (MS) to handle reimbursements or preventive 
interventions1 of varying magnitude. Consequently, this Report also describes the various steps of the intervention 
procedure (both in case of payout and for preventive interventions), the authorities involved and their interaction, and the 
way DGS manage and invest available funds. Even though it has been difficult to draw general and harmonized conclusions 
(as each incident was distinctive), some key conclusions can be made. 
The procedures that DGS have to follow widely differ and seem sometimes lengthy and complex. For instance, the 
triggering event (i.e. the unavailability of deposits) may fall within the competence of up to 8 different types of entities or 
combinations of entities across the  MS. The number of procedural steps to follow ranges from 4 to 21. It is thus not 
surprising that 13% of DGS reported cooperation deficiencies with other domestic authorities. More details can be found in 
Section 3.1 and in Annex II. 
As to payout delays, it was found that on average more than 90% of deposits (but only 70% of depositors) were reimbursed 
within the existing three-months deadline. Only around 25% of the DGS which have reimbursed depositors made use of the 
option of extending the three-month time limit set in Directive 94/19/EC to complete the payout. Half of DGS reported that 
access to data, availability of funds and  staff availability determined the speed of payout. However, the critical issue of 
ready access to funding does not seem to impede a payout within this three month deadline, since the ability of DGS to 
obtain the necessary funds seems in general good. Even if borrowing facilities are unlimited for some schemes, it takes time 
to recover this through annual contributions, for instance the SK scheme, which asked for loans in 1999-2001, is still in 
deficit. More details can be found in Section 3.4.  
JRC also collected and analyzed data relating to historical interventions where payout delays were registered, providing 
statistical analysis to the EFDI Working Group responsible for dealing with this topic. 
Even though DGS thus seem to be robust for smaller failures, there are clear limits: on average, without resorting to 
unlimited borrowing DGS declare themselves capable of coping with a single crisis of any of the smallest 64% of their 
members.  
Among those schemes which collect ex-ante contributions, most (around 90%) invest their funds, mainly in government 
bonds and short term deposits. Only in 5 MS are DGS not allowed to ask for a loan in case of a shortfall, while in around two 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that under the Directive 94/19/EC governing DGS, the mandatory task of the schemes is to reimburse depositors. 
However, beyond this Directive, some DGS are empowered by national legislation to intervene preventively. 
thirds of EU countries there is no limit to the amount of resources which can be borrowed. In this context, the study has 
presented a robustness indicator which reveals significant differences in the respective capacities of DGS to payout in the 
event of failure of one of their members (see Section 3.3). 
A significant part of the Report is devoted to a scenario analysis aimed at assessing the impact of different types of actions 
and/or interventions on DGS in each MS. Five scenarios have been developed. 
The first three scenarios are based on real-life historical payouts of differing size. The "low impact" scenario reflects a case 
where 0.035% of eligible deposits in a Member State are concerned. The "medium impact" scenario concerns 0.81% 
whereas the "high impact" scenario would affect 3.24% of eligible deposits. The low impact scenario is equivalent to the 
most severe failure in EU-15 and the high impact scenario to the most severe failure in EU-12 (where failures have had 
higher impact over the last decade). The three scenarios would lead to an average financial burden, across EU countries, of 
€100 million, €2.18 billion and €8.69 billion, respectively. More precisely, to illustrate these values, the "medium impact 
scenario" covers an amount of deposits to be paid between 34m€ for EE and 15b€ for DE.  
A small failure could be borne by all DGS using their ex-ante funds (if not in deficit). For the medium impact scenario, the 7 
MS with the highest coverage ratios would have enough ex-ante funds to cope with the repayment. On average, EU 
schemes would need around 4 times their present level of ex ante funds to handle the reimbursement. Under the high 
impact scenario, no DGS would be capable of handling reimbursement solely through existing ex-ante funds (between 2 
and 22 times the existing ex-ante funds would be needed) and schemes would need to borrow money: 24 DGS in 16 MS 
are permitted to borrow without limitation. 
A fictitious payout scenario has been also developed in order to simulate a very high impact failure of a credit institution in 
one MS with branches in a second MS. The average amount of funds needed for this scenario would be around 13.7 billion 
€. Also for this scenario, no scheme has the necessary resources to face the costs of the payouts without collecting 
additional contributions or borrowing funds. On average, ex-ante schemes would have to collect 48 times their current funds 
to be able to handle the reimbursement.  
Including all financial means available (ex-ante funds, ex-post contributions and additional borrowing, eventually unlimited), 
it would appear that 6 MS are not equipped to deal with a mid-sized failure. More details on the scenarios can be found in 
Sections 5.2 and 5.3, in particular in Table 10. 
The study also examined a scenario which simulated a preventive intervention by the schemes, in order to provide funds to 
a "failing bank", although this is not foreseen in the EU Directive. Roughly one third of schemes can decide autonomously to 
do so while roughly one third of schemes may intervene only subject to decision by other authorities.    This scenario2 
reveals that a small intervention (equivalent to 0.16% of eligible deposits, i.e. costs ranging from  €7 million to €3.13 billion3 
in the different MS) could be borne by most ex-ante funded schemes with only three of them needing to gather additional 
funds to cope with the costs of such preventive intervention.  
Particular attention has been devoted to the assessment of cross-border exposures, although only a limited amount of 
information has been gathered. For all EU countries, more than 90% of the eligible deposits are held at domestic banks, 
while in a few MS (BG, IT, RO, SK) branches from other EU MS hold more than 2% of eligible deposits.  
                                                 
2 Even though preventive interventions are note foreseen in the Directive, the scenario is based on actual preventive interventions which 
have occurred in the past. 
3 This upper range figure concerns Germany, for which data on the size of funds in DGS has not been provided: robustness of the DE 
scheme has thus not been assessed.  
The Report also describes the intervention procedure applied in the US, by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), to highlight the main differences with the EU systems. Crucial differences are firstly the ability of the US scheme to 
act before a member becomes illiquid, and subsequently the central role played by the FDIC in the resolution, since it is 
generally appointed as the receiver.  More details can be found in Section 6.  
An Annex to this Report also contains an update to the scenario analysis built in 2007 to analyze potential effects of 
harmonizing the way DGS are funded. With respect to the 2007 Report, figures are only slightly different due to the growing 
sums of deposits and funds. The overall amount of ex-ante funds in EU DGS rose slightly to approximately 13b€. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Communication4 on the review of Directive 94/19/EC5 on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS), published in November 
2006, summarized the conclusions drawn by the Commission from the consultation process and the investigations 
performed during the review of the Directive6. The Commission highlighted a number of short-term improvements to the 
existing arrangements, to be adopted via self-regulatory agreements and without the need to make changes to the existing 
legislation; more fundamental issues to be examined in coming years were also considered, these may lead to a revision of 
the Commission's policy towards DGS. 
The self-regulatory improvements cover matters such as the definition and scope of coverage of deposits, co-insurance, de 
minimis clause, topping-up arrangements, the exchange of information among EU DGS, risk-based contributions, depositor 
information and payout delays in case of a bank failure. The Communication suggests that “design and implementation of 
such solutions could be carried out in cooperation with the Commission Working Group of Member States' representatives, 
the European Forum of Deposit Insurers (EFDI)7, or representative banking associations at EU level”. 
Prior to changing current legislation on the EU DGS, the Commission stressed that further investigations on some crucial 
topics are needed, in order to understand whether differences among DGS as regards funding mechanisms, coverage 
levels, and rules for paying out to depositors, especially in the case of cross-border situations, may undermine fast and 
efficient crisis resolution. In particular, the Commission identified the need to focus on the procedures and institutions 
involved in the management of banking failures, and the analysis of the capacity of the current systems to absorb a call on 
their funds in case of potential cross border failure. 
In light of these objectives, the FINECON-EAS group (Econometrics and Applied Statistics)8 of the Joint Research Centre 
(JRC), which had already performed quantitative analyses9 on EU DGS for the Commission Communication, was asked to 
support EFDI in the investigation of the self-regulatory issues, and perform quantitative studies aimed at exploring the 
current efficiency of DGS in the event of financial distress.  
In relation to the cooperation with EFDI, JRC gathered and analyzed historical data on payout delays of DGS to depositors, 
and helped to develop common definitions concerning the scope of coverage of deposits. EFDI is responsible for drafting 
reports for each issue identified by the Commission.  
Concerning the examination of how DGS function when called into action, JRC structured the analysis in three parts. First, 
JRC focussed on the functioning of the EU DGS, considering those aspects which might impact on their effectiveness in 
                                                 
4 Communication COM(2006)729, concerning the review of Directive 94/19/EC on deposit guarantee schemes, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/guarantee/comm9419_en.pdf 
5 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes,   
Official Journal L 135 , 31/05/1994 P. 0005 – 0014, available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0019:EN:HTML 
6 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/guarantee/index_en.htm 
7 http://www.efdi.net 
8 http://finecon.jrc.it and http://farmweb.jrc.cec.eu.int/ESAF 
9 Scenario Analysis: Estimating the effects of changing the funding mechanisms of EU Deposit Guarantee Schemes, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/guarantee/final_report_en.pdf 
Report on the minimum guarantee level of Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive 94/19/EC, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/guarantee/report_en.pdf 
 
 
reacting to banking failures, such as the events that trigger DGS payouts in different EU MS, the authorities involved in the 
procedure, the amount of available funds, arrangements in place to ensure rapid transfer of funds to DGS if necessary, how 
DGS manage their funds, etc... Second, JRC collected and analyzed data on DGS' cross-border exposures in order to 
assess possible consequences of a cross-border banking default. Third, JRC analyzed historical data on banking failures 
and performed a scenario analysis to evaluate the efficiency of funds in case of payout of depositors and/or interventions 
aimed at avoiding a banking failure. Moreover, JRC was asked to compare the system currently in force in the US with 
present practices in the EU, in order to highlight the main differences. 
JRC was also asked to update the scenario analysis performed in 2006 to assess the costs of changing the way DGS are 
financed across the EU7, in order to explore the possibility of moving towards a harmonized system of financing EU DGS. 
During the consultation process, some stakeholders stated that the substantial differences in the way EU DGS are currently 
financed “raise doubts about the ability of schemes to function on a cross-border basis under crisis conditions”, and “create 
competitive distortions because of the unfair advantage to banks operating under schemes with lower costs”. Not being 
explicitly linked to the efficiency of the DGS, the updated scenario analysis is reported in Annex I to this Report.  
 
This Report presents the results of the quantitative analyses performed by JRC and is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes the survey prepared and distributed by JRC in cooperation with the Directorate General for Internal Market and 
Services. This survey, which is attached in Annex V, also covers some of the issues investigated by the Working Groups of 
the EFDI, such as the analysis of payout delays and the exploration of risk-based methodologies for DGS contribution 
adjustments. Section 2 also describes the data on deposits, collected through the survey, used as the basis for the 
quantitative analysis presented in the remaining sections of the Report. Section 3 describes how DGS currently function and 
evaluates their efficiency, while Section 4 presents the analysis of cross-border exposures in the EU. The first part of 
Section 5 investigates the potential costs of banking failures and preventative interventions performed by EU DGS, based 
on available data from earlier events; the second part presents scenario analyses to evaluate the efficiency of funds during 
financial distresses of varying nature and gravity. Section 6 is devoted to the description of the US system while the last 
Section 7 concludes. Moreover, six annexes are attached. Annex I presents the updated scenario analysis estimating the 
effects of changing the DGS funding mechanisms. Annex II contains a series of tables describing on a country by country 
basis the procedures adopted by DGS in case of reimbursement. Annex III presents for each DGS a description of the 
resources available in case of need. Annex IV includes the complete dataset of historical payouts/interventions. Finally 
Annexes V and VI detail the JRC survey and the list of attached definitions. 
Finally, it should be noted that this report does neither commit the Commission nor does it limit the Commission's discretion 
with regard to any current or future actions or policies. 
2. Source of information 
2.1 Survey 
In order to perform the analysis and to support the scenario investigation, a survey was prepared by JRC to collect data on 
a DGS by DGS basis. The survey, included in Annex V of this Report, aimed to obtain a general overview of the DGS 
functioning across MS and covered issues such as quantitative information on deposits, cross-border exposures and 
topping-up, interventions and reimbursement of depositors, and risk-based approaches to adjust DGS contributions and/or 
monitor DGS members’ risk profiles.  
JRC distributed the questionnaire to EU MS in July 2007 and received responses between September and December 
2007.10 37 out of 39 schemes replied to the survey. The two missing schemes are both from Germany and cover private and 
savings banks. Unless otherwise specified, data collected from this survey represent the inputs for analysis in the following 
sections. The data collected were cross checked with other databases available. Few discrepancies were found, which 
could relate to the fact that different sources or methods were used. 
Note that following a request from the EEA representative in the EU Working Group on DGS, the survey was also sent to 
EEA countries; only Norway has replied and this response is included in the Report for comparative purposes. 
 
2.2 Data on deposits 
The first set of relevant data for the scenario analysis consists of data on the total amount of deposits, eligible deposits, and 
covered deposits, since these are the basis for the scenarios. Following  the analysis performed in the 2007 Report and the 
request to update the database built using historical data, MS were asked to provide quantitative information on the total 
amount of deposits of their members (excluding those deposits left out from any repayment by virtue of Article 2 of the 
Directive5), the amount of eligible deposits, and the amount of covered deposits.11 Table 1 (columns two to four) reports 
these figures for each DGS, for 2005.12 It also reports in the last two columns the size of the fund for the ex-ante DGS in 
2005, and the amount of contributions collected in 2006 by each scheme.13 
                                                 
10 At the EFDI annual meeting held in Istanbul in November 2007 JRC met the EU DGS representatives to discuss their answers, 
confirm data, check on confidentiality issues, and to clarify some information to be included in the final version of the present Report.  
11 For further information on the definitions of total, eligible and covered deposits please see the file of definitions distributed with the 
survey and attached in Annex VI. 
12 In some countries (DE, ES, IT, CY, AT, PT) more than one DGS is operating In DE, the compensation system is quite complex 
because of historical reasons and 6 compensation schemes are operating: 2 schemes are statutory and protect credit institutions under 
public law or ownership (DE1) and private (DE2) law; 2 are institutional and protect cooperatives banks (DE3) and saving banks together 
with the Landesbanken (DE4). Moreover there are 2 voluntary schemes providing additional protection to private and public credit 
institutions. These latter are not included in the analysis. In ES 3 DGS are operating, representing Private Banks (ES1), Cooperative 
Banks (ES2), and Saving Banks (ES3). In Italy 2 DGS are operating, one covers Cooperative Banks (IT2); the second one the other 
institutions (IT1). In CY 2 DGS are present, one protecting Cooperative Banks and Credit Institutions (CY2), the second the remaining 
institutions (CY1). In AT five DGS are set up covering private commercial banks (AT1), rural cooperative banks (AT2), private savings 
banks (AT3), industrial cooperative banks (AT4), and privatised provincial mortgage banks (AT5). In Portugal two DGS are operating, 
one relative to Cooperative Banks included in the Mutual Agriculture Integrated System (PT2); the second covering other institutions 
(PT1). 
13 As can be seen from Table 1,the DGS from new MS provided almost all the required data; for some EU-15 DGS (DE1, DE2, DE4, and 
NL) no data was gathered. Other DGS (BE, DK, DE3, IE, GR, ES, FR, CY, AT, PT2, UK) did not report all types of deposits. Compared 
to the previous survey, PL and SI provided data on the total amount of deposits, SE supplied the amount of eligible deposits, and three 
MS (LT, HU, PL) furnished data on covered deposits. CY and IE in 2006 provided data on the eligible and covered deposits. 
In  
Table 2 aggregated values of deposits per MS are summarised. In order to complete the database and following the 
procedure adopted for the 2007 Report, several estimates are included in this table. Results presented in this Report are 
based on the aggregated data per MS as shown in  
Table 2. Eurostat data have been used in order to reproduce the total amount of deposits for DE, ES, and NL. Concerning 
the total amount of eligible deposits for DE and NL, Eurostat data have again been used to obtain an estimate. 
Approximations for the amounts of eligible deposits of DK, IE and CY are obtained by applying a ratio to the total amount of 
deposits of these MS. This ratio, obtained by the dataset, represents an estimate of the total amount of eligible deposits 
over the total amount of deposits for these countries. 
Separate approximations of the ratio, which are summarised in Table 3, are calculated for each of these MS using the 
dataset. For DK a ratio of 83.43% is used by considering the average ratio of total amount of eligible deposits over the total 
amount of deposits in SE and FI14. This average has been chosen as these three MS have, to some extent, the same types 
of eligible deposits (that is, exclusions from guarantee, following Annex I of Directive 94/19, are nearly the same). For IE, a 
ratio of 63.96% is obtained by averaging all available EU-15 ratios15. Finally, for CY a ratio of 84.65% is applied and 
obtained from data provided by the schemes themselves in 2006. 
                                                 
14 Note that in the last survey only the ratio of FI was available and was used to estimate the eligible deposits of DK and SE. 
15 The ratios of Finland (96.57%) and Luxembourg (15.11%) are excluded because these values are outlying with respect to the 
distribution of the other EU-15 countries. 
Table 1: Deposits, fund size, and amount of contributions in thousands of Euro (t€) per DGS. 
 2005 Total amount of deposits (t€) 
2005 Total amount of 
eligible deposits (t€) 
2005 Total amount of 
covered deposits (t€) 
2005 Fund size 
(t€) 
2006 Contributions  
(t€) 
BE 473 695 000 215 427 000 N.A. 713 000 44 799 
BG 11 071 740 9 718 707 5 276 767 153 884 43 372 
CZ 64 125 000 57 943 000 31 541 000 177 900 48 300 
DK 154 138 060 N.A. 57 307 821 16475 839 0 
DE1 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
DE2 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
DE3 532 000 000 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
DE4 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
EE 5 743 101 4 282 881 1 667 279 66 000 16 328 
IE 278 215 100 N.A. N.A. 337 500 N.A. 
GR 168 795 189 118 735 607 N.A. 688 487 110 197 
ES1 N.A. 221 719 422 94 548 971 1 920 093 140 379 
ES2 N.A. 53 337 000 29 745 000 388 700 42 782 
ES3 N.A. 361 482 000 191 502 000 2 906 070 145 515 
FR 1 103 293 000 1 018 477 953 N.A. 1 475 000 152 000 
IT1 1 712 482 803 513 497 675 372 042 284 0 170 
IT2 110 147 620 50 796 416 42 314 974 0 170 
CY1 28 819 529 N.A. N.A. 5 590 0 
CY2 7 837 838 N.A. N.A. 2 160 0 
LV 8 912 115 8 606 405 1 609 716 49 541 18 148 
LT 10 228 000 7 077 914 3 702 460 162 663 34 133 
LU 589 344 816 89 053 647 12 437 498 0 0 
HU 45 569 369 36 787 544 20 272 471 228 880 6 889 
MT18 (*)6 906 226 (*)5 705 739 (*)4 799 066 3 026 983 
NL N.A. N.A. N.A. 0 0 
AT1 57 048 164 46 000 000 22 296 079 0 0 
AT2 75 000 000 N.A. 39 000 000 0 0 
AT3 89 000 000 N.A. 42 000 000 0 0 
AT4 16 134 646 N.A. 10 047 058 0 0 
AT5 9 698 000 N.A. 4 004 000 0 0 
PL 102 494 381 94 801 324 90 067 687 358 479 36 622 
PT1 152 353 000 116 215 000 59 200 000 1 171 000 33 156 
PT2 8 134 695 7 670 838 N.A. 55 218 13 772 
RO 23 365 690 12 048 429 9 521 818 143 661 30 993 
SI 14 368 437 12 467 746 7 130 338 0 0 
SK 21 594 509 10 982 049 10 876 452 19-78 974 25 298 
FI 83 442 597 80 577 207 38 270 563 375 000 40 390 
SE 164 669 543 115 745 113 703 56 132 503 1 672 259 57 719 
UK 2 165 474 974 1 091 492 777 N.A. 209 886 0 
NO 149 530 369 120 100 188 71 383 845 1 953 663 63 
Source: Survey data; (*) Estimates from the dataset; ; N.A. for not available.  
                                                 
16 The fund in DK is made up partly of liquid cash (around 30%) and partly of pledges (see note 25): both are included in the figure. 
17 IT1 and IT2 are ex-post schemes collecting a small contribution to cover administrative expenses. 
18 Since before February 2006 the Maltese DGS covered deposits only in Maltese Liri, data provided referred only to these deposits. To 
include deposits in other EU-currencies, data were adjusted using other information provided by the Maltese DGS. 
19 In years 1999–2001 four banks went bankruptcy in SK. Since the fund held by the DGS was not enough to cover the total costs, the 
National Bank of SK provided the DGS with a loan for compensation disbursements. A residual loan was also taken out by commercial 
banks. 
20 Though classified as an ex-post scheme, UK has a residual fund, inheritance of the previous system. 
 
Table 2: Deposits, fund size and contributions in t€ per MS. 
 
2005 Total 
amount of 
deposits  
(t€) 
2005 Total 
amount of 
eligible deposits  
(t€) 
2005 Total 
amount of 
covered deposits 
(t€) 
2005 
Fund size 
(t€) 
2006 
Contributions  
(t€) 
BE 473 695 000 215 427 000 (*)115 280 631 713 000 44 799 
BG 11 071 740 9 718 707 5 276 767 153 884 43 372 
CZ 64 125 000 57 943 000 31 541 000 177 900 48 300 
DK 154 138 060 (*)128 593 810 57 307 821 475 839 0 
DE (e)2 061 481 000 (e)1 911 376 000 (*)1 022 827 364  N.A. N.A. 
EE 5 743 101 4 282 881 1 667 279 66 000 16 328 
IE 278 215 100 (*)177 946 960 (*)95 224 079 337 500 N.A. 
GR 168 795 189 118 735 607 (*)63 538 533 688 487 110 197 
ES (e)870 258 840 636 538 422 315 795 971 5 214 864 328 675 
FR 1 103 293 000 1 018 477 953 (*)620 604 010 1 475 000 152 000 
IT 1 897 647 620 583 074 516 427 814 974 0 0 
CY 36 657 367 (*)31 030 373 (*)10 432 809 7 751 0 
LV 8 912 115 8 606 405 1 609 716 49 541 18 148 
LT 10 228 000 7 077 914 3 702 460 162 663 34 133 
LU 589 344 816 89 053 647 12 437 498 0 0 
HU 45 569 369 36 787 544 20 272 471 228 880 6 889 
MT 6 906 226 5 705 739 4 799 066 3 026 983 
NL (e)500 936 990 (e)482 343 020 (*)293 913 100 0 0 
AT 246 880 810 185 000 000 117 347 137 0 0 
PL 102 494 381 94 801 324 90 067 687 358 479 36 622 
PT 160 487 695 123 885 838 (*)63 107 530 1 226 218 46 928 
RO 23 365 690 12 048 429 9 521 818 143 661 30 993 
SI 14 368 437 12 467 746 7 130 338 0 0 
SK 21 594 509 10 982 049 10 876 452 -78 974 25 298 
FI 83 442 597 80 577 207 38 270 563 375 000 40 390 
SE 164 669 543 115 745 114 56 132 503 1 672 259 57 719 
UK 2 165 474 974 1 091 492 777 (*)665 095 197 209 886 0 
UE 11 269 797 167 7 249 719 981 4 161 594 773 13 460 864 941 290 
NO 149 530 369 120 100 188 71 383 845 1 953 663 63 
Source: Survey data; (*) Estimates from the dataset; (e) Eurostat data. 
 
Table 3: Procedure for the estimation of the 2005 amount of eligible deposits. 
 
Total amount of  
deposits (t€) 
(A) 
Ratio 
(rounded to 2 decimals) 
(B) 
Total amount of  
eligible deposits (t€) 
= (A) * (B) 
DK 54 138 060  83.43% 128 593 809  
IE 278 215 100  63.96% 177 946 959  
CY 36 657 367  84.65%  31 030 372  
Source: Survey data. 
 
Estimates for the amount of covered deposits presented in  
Table 2 are in most cases estimated by applying a ratio to the amount of eligible deposits. Following the procedure used in 
the previous Report, different ratios are applied to different MS, depending on their level of coverage (see definition in 
Annex VI). For those EU-15 MS with a level of coverage lower or equal to € 25 000 and with a missing value for the amount 
of covered deposits (BE, DE, IE, GR), the ratio is calculated by averaging the available ratios of the amount of covered over 
eligible deposits of EU-15 MS, with a level of coverage lower or equal to € 25 00021 (the average being around 53.51%). 
For those EU-15 MS with a level of coverage higher than € 25 000 and with a missing value for the amount of covered 
deposits (FR, NL, UK), the ratio is estimated by averaging the available ratios of EU-15 MS with a level of coverage higher 
than € 25 00022 (the average being nearly 60.93%).  
 
Table 4: Procedure for the estimation of the 2005 amount of covered deposits.  
 
Total amount of  
eligible deposits (t€) 
(A) 
Ratio 
(rounded to 2 decimals) 
(B) 
Total amount of  
covered deposits (t€) 
= (A) * (B) 
BE 215 427 000 115 280 631 
DE23 (e)1 911 376 000 1 022 827 364 
GR 118 735 607 63 538 533 
IE (*)177 946 960 
53.51% 
95 224 079 
FR 1 018 477 953 620 604 010 
UK 1 091 492 777 665 095 197 
NL (e)482 343 020 
60.93% 
293 913 100 
PT2 123 885 838 50.94% 63 107 530 
CY (*)31 030 373 33.62% 10 432 809 
Source: Survey data; (e) Eurostat data; (*) Estimates from the dataset. 
                                                 
21 The ratio of the amount of covered deposits to the amount of eligible deposits of Luxembourg was excluded from the average ratio 
because Luxembourg’s ratio is extremely low (13.97%) compared to the others and can be considered an outlier. 
22 Note that in the last survey a ratio based only on the two Italian DGS was used. In the present survey SE also provided data on both 
the eligible and covered deposits. 
23 Note that the ratio applied to DE does not account for the protection guaranteed by the voluntary schemes, which is unlimited. 
Note that PT is treated separately, since one of the two DGS provided data on the total amount of covered and eligible 
deposits (the ratio is 50.94%). An estimate of the total amount of covered deposits for the other Portuguese DGS is obtained 
from this ratio. As regards EU-12 MS, data for CY is missing, and the ratio of 33.62% is obtained by data provided by the 
DGS themselves in the 2006 survey. Table 4 summarises the amount of eligible deposits, the ratios applied and the 
estimates obtained for the amount of covered deposits. 
 
2.3 Data on DGS funding and level of coverage 
Compared to the situation depicted in the 2007 Report, during the last year EU DGS have not changed their funding 
mechanisms. None have moved from an ex-ante to an ex-post system or vice versa, and none of the ex-ante schemes have 
adopted new methodologies for estimating their annual premiums. However, it is worthwhile  noting that some schemes 
(RO, SE, UK) are currently revising the methodology to estimate their members’ contributions. For instance RO is in the 
process of drafting specific regulations for defining a “Fund’s exposure coverage rate” and for estimating the annual 
contribution of their members. Concerning SE, a new method to measure the risk of DGS members and accordingly adjust 
DGS premiums is under development by the Swedish National Debt Office, which incorporated the Swedish DGS at the 
beginning of 2008. Note also that the UK Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) has recognized the need to be able to make 
early, forward-looking and accurate assessments of a bank’s risk of failure24. To facilitate early assessment, the FSA intends 
to investigate the introduction of new rules that would require UK banks to provide additional evidence to the competent 
authority that they are meeting threshold conditions on an ongoing and forward-looking basis. 
Upon explicit request, the classification adopted in the 2007 Report to categorize DGS according to their funding 
mechanism has been reviewed and only two classes are considered: "DGS featuring an ex-ante component" and "mere ex-
post schemes". This new classification still reflects the definitions in Annex VI even after removing the class “Other” which 
was used in the 2007 Report for DGS characterized by a peculiar mixture or combination of an ex-ante and an ex-post 
component25. The classification of the DGS according to the new categories is presented in Figure 1. 
 
                                                 
24 More details are available in the report “Financial stability and depositor protection: strengthening the framework”, by HM Treasure, 
FSA, and Bank of England, available at  
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/3/5/banking_stability_pu477.pdf 
25 The schemes whose funding mechanism was classified as “Other” in the 2007 Report are DK, CY, MT, PL, RO. In DK, only a part of 
the contribution (at least 25%) is paid to the fund and the rest takes the form of pledges to guarantee payment, if the need arises. The 
regulations governing the operation of the Cypriot schemes foresee three different types of contribution: initial (ex-ante), supplementary 
and special (ex-post). The Maltese DGS collects ex-ante contributions to maintain a target size for the fund, and ex-post levies in case of 
need. The Polish scheme levies both ex-ante contributions for an assistance fund, and ex-post contributions for compensation purposes 
in case of a member’s failure. Finally, in RO the contributions are defined in terms of a determined ex-ante part plus an ex-post part 
which consists of stand-by lines of credit granted yearly by every member.  
 
Ex−ante (78%)
Ex−post (22%)
 
Figure 1: Pie chart of the funding mechanism per MS. 
 
To measure the adequacy of the DGS’ funds the following definition of coverage ratio is applied:  
(2005) Deposits Eligible of Amount Total
(2005) Fund the of Size  Ratio Coverage = . 
Table 5 shows the values of the ratio for the EU-15 MS (left column) and the twelve new MS (right column). Countries are 
ranked in decreasing order of coverage ratio.  
Table 5: EU-15 and new MS ranked by decreasing coverage ratio. 
EU-15 Coverage ratio (%) New MS Coverage ratio (%) 
SE 1.44 LT 2.30 
PT 0.99 BG 1.58 
ES 0.82 EE 1.54 
GR 0.58 RO 1.19 
FI 0.47 HU 0.62 
DK (*)0.37 LV 0.58 
BE 0.33 PL 0.38 
IE (*)0.19 CZ 0.31 
FR 0.14 MT 0.05 
UK20 0.001 CY (*)0.02 
  SK -0.72 
NO 1.63   
Source: Survey data; (*) Data on eligible deposits estimated from the dataset. 
 
Figure 2 plots the coverage ratios in increasing order. The horizontal black line in the picture represents the EU average 
coverage ratio (around 0.70%), obtained using data from Table 5, excluding Slovakia’s negative coverage ratio. The 
average coverage ratio in the EU-15 countries is around 0.53% (0.59% when excluding UK, see note 20). When considering 
new MS, the average coverage ratio is higher (0.86%). The standard deviations in EU-15 and new MS are respectively 
0.44% and 0.76%. In comparison to the 2007 Report, SE has become the MS with the highest coverage ratio in the EU-15 
(from 1.09% to 1.44%). This change is due to the fact that in the last Report data on eligible deposits for SE were estimated, 
while this year they have been provided by the DGS. For the EU-12, although the rank has slightly changed from the 2007 
Report, no significant variation in the coverage ratios is detectable.  
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Figure 2: Coverage ratios in countries with an ex-ante financed DGS. 
 
Finally, a few variations in the levels of coverage and payout limits applied across MS have been registered between the 
2007 Report (figures as of 01/01/2007) and current values (as of 01/01/2008). The levels of coverage have changed in EE, 
LT and LV closed their transitional period, establishing a new level of coverage up to 20 000€ as suggested in the Directive 
94/19/EC. Note that coinsurance rules have slightly changed in LT due to the increase in the level of coverage. NL started 
applying 10% coinsurance on deposits above 20 000 €, while in the UK coinsurance is no longer applied. 
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Figure 3: Payout limit and level of coverage. 
3. Efficiency 
 
The survey distributed to EU DGS covered different aspects of the manner in which DGS operate in case of intervention, 
both for preventive interventions and for reimbursements of depositors. In particular, the survey aimed to investigate 
whether current practices can handle a failure in an efficient and effective manner. This section presents and briefly 
discusses the data collected. The first part concentrates on descriptive aspects such as the types of interventions allowed, 
the events triggering the DGS activation, the institutions involved and their cooperation. Subsequently, the financial 
resources available to DGS are described, with emphasis on the maximum amount of available funds at disposal. Finally a 
summary of quantitative information on payout delays is provided.  
Note that in the following paragraphs, in order to describe the different aspects of the functioning of DGS, data collected 
through the survey has been treated and standardised into classes. This means that comparable declarations have been 
harmonized and clustered together. The definitions of the classes might introduce minor alterations of the information 
collected, due to aggregation choices and  to the scope of the investigation.  
 
3.1 Actions and interventions 
The first distinction to be made concerns the roles assigned to DGS. Under Directive 94/19/EC, all DGS must have a 
statutory obligation to repay depositors in case of failure: 16 schemes are limited to this role (in the previous survey they 
were classified as “only pay-box schemes”). All other schemes replying to the survey (precisely 21) are allowed to perform 
other tasks such as preventive interventions. Note that some schemes tend to intervene mainly preventively, leaving 
compensation of depositors as the final option: this case is common among mutual guarantee schemes for cooperative 
banks.  
Regarding the payout procedure, the event triggering the DGS activation is in general the unavailability of deposits or, more 
precisely, the declaration of unavailability of deposits. In a few cases MS law establishes a time frame for the competent 
authority to officially declare the unavailability of deposits from the date on which the material fact (i.e. the operative inability 
to repay one depositor) was established.26 In CZ, DE, GR, MA, FI this limit is set at 21 days, while in SK and HU it is 5 days. 
In some Member States this declaration is made by the Central Bank or by the Banking Supervisory Authority (BSA), while 
in other cases the payout procedure is activated by a decision of the competent Court. Figure 4 presents, in a pie-plot, the 
segregation of duties between authorities for declaring the unavailability of deposits for each DGS, and shows that the 
situation is rather heterogeneous across the EU. Different entities (or combinations of entities) other than the DGS can carry 
out the declaration, though in more than 50% of the cases the BSA is one of the authorities involved.  
 In general, after the declaration of unavailability of deposits, depositors are informed either through an announcement in the 
Official Gazette of the country, or via other media. In some cases there is a limit of three days (following the declaration of 
unavailability) set in the Statute for the announcement (EE, SI, ES). 
                                                 
26 Under Article 1(3) of Directive 94/19/EC: “The competent authorities shall make that determination as soon as possible and at the 
latest 21 days after first becoming satisfied that a credit institution has failed to repay deposits which are due and payable”. 
A detailed description of the procedure followed by each scheme for the payout of depositors is provided in Annex II, 
including information about the competent authority and a reference to the corresponding legislation. Note that not all DGS 
have provided information on this point, leaving, in some cases, ambiguities on the legislation to be applied, e.g. Banking 
Act or Bankruptcy Law. In general, a great variety of situations are described in Annex II: in many cases the DGS is the 
authority in charge both to verify claims and to manage the payout procedure, for instance by nominating a paying agent to 
operatively reimburse depositors; in other cases a third-party receiver in charge of the bankruptcy procedure might work in 
strict cooperation with the DGS, for example preparing the list of depositors or approving their claims.  
Central Bank and Ministry (5%)
Central Bank and Court (21%)
Central Bank, Court and BSA (3%)
Central Bank, BSA and Ministry (3%)
Court, BSA and Ministry (3%)
Central Bank (13%)
N.A.(10%)
Court and BSA (23%)
BSA (21%)
 
Figure 4: Competent authority in charge to declare unavailability of deposits. 
  
Regarding preventive interventions, in some countries the DGS has the power to decide autonomously on intervention to 
avoid a failure. Often, the Board of the DGS acts on the basis of a monitoring system developed to assess the risk of the 
DGS members. Different indicators are used to measure risk, such as the Capital Adequacy Ratio or Solvency Ratio27. For 
other DGS, preventive interventions are driven by a decision involving other institutions such as the Central Bank, the 
Banking Supervisory Authority and the Ministry of Finance/Economy, as sketched in Figure 5. 
Although there are no common rules to start the supporting procedure, the underlying principle is often the “least cost 
principle”: a preventive intervention to avoid a default usually drives a lower cost than the failure itself. In general, the basic 
target is to ensure the stability of the financial system and banking sector, while any specific situation is carefully and 
regularly monitored by the Boards, in particular by Cooperative schemes. Note that in PL the bank itself must ask for 
financial assistance. 
                                                 
27 A detailed report on existing risk monitoring approaches is foreseen to be delivered within spring 2008. 
DGS and BSA (3%)
Central Bank (15%)
DGS and Central Bank (10%)
BSA (3%)
DGS and Ministry (3%)
DGS (21%)
N.A. (5%)Only compensation (41%)
 
Figure 5: Competent authorities for interventions other than payout. 
 
DGS were also asked to comment on possible cooperation deficiencies experienced with other authorities involved in the 
intervention, which might slow down the process or reduce its efficiency. In most of the cases (around 70%) no cooperation 
deficiency had arisen. Based on historical cases, only a few DGS reported difficulties in the interaction with the other 
institutions involved, as shown in Figure 6.   
Yes, with the receiver (5%)
Yes, with the BSA (5%)
Yes, with the BSA and 
         with the liquidator (3%)       
No payout until now (11%)
No (68%)
N.A. (8%)
 
Figure 6: Cooperation deficiencies between DGS and other authorities in case of action. 
 
3.2 Financial resources 
This paragraph describes the resources at the disposal of EU DGS to handle potential banking failures or preventive 
interventions. Besides the size of the fund (see Table 1), other characteristics are examined in order to understand the 
complete spectrum of resources each DGS can call on if necessary. These cover the possibility to raise additional 
contributions up to a certain maximum, to levy so called extraordinary premia, and the option to borrow money.  
Concerning available funds, as already shown in Section 2, among EU DGS 9 schemes are funded in an ex-post way. For 
these schemes, there is no fund cumulated by the scheme prior to any action, but for some DGS there might be a virtual 
fund, earmarked or explicitly set aside by the members. Among ex-ante schemes, in most of the cases (nearly 90% of the 
ex-ante DGS) funds are directly managed by the DGS. Only in very few cases funds are given by ring-fenced reserves or 
partially earmarked by members. Regarding the way ex-ante DGS manage their resources, in all but one case funds are 
invested, as detailed in Figure 7. For the great majority, funds are invested in national and/or EU bonds or similar 
government securities and there are significant cases where schemes resort to short-term deposits. Whenever more risky 
instruments are allowed, strict limitations are set in the statutes/by-laws in order to limit the risk in the DGS portfolio, for 
example a minimum rating for the instrument is required.  
 
YES, government securities, 
short term deposits (10%)   
YES, government securities, limited       
amount of other financial instruments (7%)
YES, high−rated low−risk instruments (3%)
YES, government securities, short−term deposits,  
limited amount of other financial instruments (3%)
YES, bonds, equities (3%)
NO (3%)
YES, government securities,         
high−rated low−risk instruments(17%)
YES, short term deposits (7%)
N.A.(10%)
YES, government  
securities (34%%)
 
Figure 7: Funds invested by ex-ante DGS. 
 
Concerning other resources, the possibility of borrowing funds deserves separate analysis. Seven schemes (BE, DE3, IE28, 
IT1, IT2, LV, NL29) are not allowed to borrow money, neither from institutional sources (Government, Central Bank) nor on 
the free market. In contrast , the option of asking for a loan is permitted for 30 DGS. Note that for these 30 DGS, in 24 cases 
there is no limitation explicitly set in the DGS Regulations to the amount of money that can be borrowed, thus introducing a 
theoretically infinite capability to collect money. However, since this option seems unrealistic, some schemes openly 
declared that a limit on borrowing must be considered as in force, despite the absence of an explicit limit in the regulation. 
For example, a ceiling on annual contributions introduces a limit to the capability of repaying a loan: the DGS in SK, whose 
fund is negative due to a loan taken in 2001, is still gathering money to repay the debt. In relation to borrowing, it must be 
                                                 
28 The Irish Central Bank is responsible for the scheme and is obliged under law to make reimbursements as appropriate. 
29 In case of default the Dutch National Bank advances funds to insured depositors and then ask members to repay the loan. 
noted that in many cases loans taken by schemes are guaranteed by the Central Bank or the Government (See Annex III of 
the 2007 Report).  
Finally note that, regarding own funds of DGS, more than half of the schemes (20 out of 39) have no link with the 
corresponding Investor Compensation Scheme (ICS). In 6 cases the DGS and ICS are grouped into a single Legal Entity, 
keeping funding and managing separate; in 7 cases they have separate funds managed together (data provided regard only 
DGS), while in the remaining 4 cases the two schemes act as a single legal entity; Figure 8 shows all the various 
configurations. 
One Scheme, data 
on DGS (18%)     
One unique Scheme (10%)
Two Schemes, one management (15%)
N.A.(5%)NO link (51%)
 
Figure 8: Link between DGS and ICS. 
3.3 Maximum amount of available resources 
Considering the various types of resources available to DGS, this paragraph presents an introductory analysis aiming to 
estimate the maximum amount of funds each scheme can collect in the event of intervention. Notwithstanding the simplistic 
approach, this analysis can give a significant insight into the current financial capability of EU DGS. 
The estimation of the maximum amount of resources includes current funds, maximum level of annual contributions, 
maximum level of extraordinary contributions, and borrowing. Note that in the survey, the schemes were asked to estimate 
and comment on the maximum amount of money available in case of need and to provide comment on its composition. 
Whenever an estimate was not provided by the DGS, statues, bylaws, and data from the 2006 survey30 have been used to 
obtain an approximation of the maximum available funds. Moreover, DGS were also asked to declare how many members 
would be covered by the maximum amount of funds available, that is to estimate how many members would be covered in 
case a single intervention occurs. To explore this point the following “robustness indicator” is defined: 
 
DGS  the  in  members  of  Number
resources  ofamount    maximum of value the under  lie  deposits    whosemembers  of  NumberIndicator  Robustness = . 
 
In the formula the maximum amount of resources includes all sources, except unlimited borrowing. The robustness indicator 
gives the percentage of banks in the scheme whose eligible31 deposits are lower or equivalent to the maximum amount of 
resources available to the DGS. For example, a value of 90% would indicate that only 10% of banks have eligible deposits 
that exceed the available DGS resources. In other words, under the hypothesis of a single intervention (as suggested by the 
dataset, multiple interventions in the same year have resulted quite uncommon), the robustness indicator gives the 
percentage of banks that would be theoretically covered.  
In order to complete the analysis, the “extended robustness indicator” is defined, which includes in the amount of resources 
also the possibility of unlimited borrowing: in this case, theoretically, their indicator is 100%. It is must be remarked that, 
even if unlimited borrowing is allowed, recovering a high amount of money could take time. As an example, the case of SK 
can be considered: the Slovakian scheme had to face the highest impact in EU (see intensity ratio description in Section 5.1 
and Annex IV) in 2001 and is still in deficit. This point is strengthened by the following observation: excluding dramatic 
events, the majority of the MS declare that the option to activate extraordinary contribution or to raise the annual contribution 
is the main tool to ensure rapid transfer of funds. 
                                                 
30 See Annex III to the Report. 
31 In general, as usual,  eligible deposits have been taken as a reference. However, in countries for which the contribution base is not 
given by eligible deposits, the “proxy" of the indicator is calculated by resorting directly to values provided by the DGS themselves. In few 
cases, it could not be clarified whether total, eligible, or covered deposits were referred to. 
Information is reported in  
 
 
Table 6 and Table 7, aggregated by MS. The first table shows in column A the 2005 fund, in column B the description of 
available resources (including borrowing where limited), in column C the maximum amount of funds reachable considering 
these resources (provided by the DGS or estimated with available information), and in column D the percentage of members 
covered by  the estimated amount of resources, which is the value of the robustness indicator. 
Table 7 focuses on the description of the borrowing, including information on which countries declare the possibility to 
borrow an unlimited amount of funds (column E) and the corresponding value of the robustness indicator (column F). The 
first two column of the table report information already presented in  
 
 
Table 6  for comparison purposes.  
Wherever possible, data presented in  
 
 
Table 6 and Table 7 has been provided directly by the DGS. Regarding borrowing, a value is included in the estimates of  
 
 
Table 6 only if either a maximum is estimated by the DGS or provided for in the DGS Regulation. A detailed description of 
the maximum amount of contributions and extraordinary contributions per DGS is presented in Annex III.  
Concerning ex-post schemes, an estimation of the virtual fund is provided for IT and SI32 in  
 
 
Table 6. For LU, NL and AT a maximum on the annual contributions is set in the Regulation (see Annex III) but cannot be 
estimated since expressed in terms of inaccessible variables (e.g. amount of shareholders’ equity, members’ own funds, 
etc…). Also for SK the maximum amount of resources is  unavailable, as this DGS is currently in deficit. 
Comparing the size of available funds with the estimated maximum amount of available resources (not including borrowing, 
if not limited) shows that for some schemes (EE, FR, LV, LT, PL) the two values are the same33, while for DGS with very low 
coverage ratios (e.g. CY) the maximum amount can be up to 11 times current funds. Note also that for FI the declared 
maximum amount of resources is much higher (more than 13 times) than current funds. On average the maximum amount 
of resources is around 3 times the value of present funds.  
Excluding schemes with unlimited borrowing, 14 provided information on the number of members covered by the maximum 
amount of available resources. On average these EU schemes declare themselves able to  cover a default of two thirds of 
their smallest members (average robustness indicator around 64%, see last but one row of  
 
 
Table 6). By including unlimited borrowing the value raises to around 86% (see the extended robustness indicator in Table 
7).  
At first sight this value suggests that globally the schemes are able to intervene in a satisfactory percentage of cases: 
without unlimited borrowing values for the indicator range from 0% (MT), that is none of the members would be covered in 
                                                 
32 For IT, there is a fixed amount of money that the members undertake to make available to the Fund for interventions, varying between 
0.4% and 0.8% of the covered deposits from all the members on 30 June of the previous year. 
For SI, banks must invest assets in the amount of at least 2.5% of their covered deposits. 
33 For EE the total amount of available resources is the 2007 fund. 
case of a failure, to 95% (HU), that is the DGS is able to collect money necessary to repay depositors for almost any 
potential failure. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Estimation of maximum amount of resources excluding borrowing when unlimited, and percentage of members covered. 
 A B C D 
 Size of the fund 2005 (€) 
Description of available resources 
(excluding borrowing when unlimited) 
Maximum amount 
of resources 
described in 
column B (€) 
Robustness indicator  
(without unlimited 
borrowing, i.e. referring 
only to the amount 
presented in column C) 
BE 713 000 000 Fund + guarantees + 2 annual contribution 824 000 000 83.48% 
BG 153 883 517 Fund + maximum extra contribution (*)299 664 119 N.A. 
CZ 177 900 000 Estimated borrowing approx. equal to 10 years income (syndicated loan+ bond) 1 100 000 000 80.00% 
DK 475 839 421 Fund + maximum contribution (*)784 115 542 N.A. 
DE N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
EE 65 999 731 2007 Fund 95 867 473 71.43% 
IE 337 500 000 Fund + max. contribution based on eligible (*)693 393 919 N.A. 
GR 688 487 497 Fund + contribution + extra contributions 1 219 051 431 46.34% 
ES 5 214 863 500 Fund + maximum contribution (*)6 487 940 344 N.A. 
FR 1 475 000 000 Fund (*)1 475 000 000 N.A. 
IT 0 Total virtual funds32 of the 2 DGS 1 987 361 740 90.50% 
CY 7 750 654 total assets + max. borrowing + max. contribution aggregated over the 2 DGS 85 650 112 37.36% 
LV 49 541 425 Fund (*)49 541 425 25.45% 
LT 162 663 420 2007 Fund 213 130 213 N.A. 
LU 0 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
HU 228 880 452 Fund + maximum loan 317 750 328 95.61% 
MT 3 025 844 Fund + maximum  borrowing 4 200 000 0.00% 
NL 0 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
AT 0 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
PL 358 479 275 Fund 358 479 275 N.A. 
PT 1 226 218 214 Own funds aggregated over the two DGS (*)1 761 282 525 3487.76% 
RO 143 660 671 Own funds + stand-by lines
35 + 
extraordinary contributions  
(*)507 292 074 81.25% 
SI 0 Virtual fund32 189 022 144 N.A. 
SK -78 974 050 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
FI 375 000 000 Liquidation of the DGS assets and estimated borrowing 5 000 000 000 76.92% 
SE 1 672 258 614 Fund + maximum contribution (*)1 750 844 118 N.A. 
UK 9 886 181 0.3% of the contribution base36 3 900 000 000 N.A. 
EU Total 13 460 864 367  29 074 804 994  
EU Aver.    64.68% 
NO 1 953 663 118 Twice the fund minimum level 4 132 748 90437 98.58% 
Source: Survey data and 2006 survey data; (*) Data estimated by JRC using all available information. 
                                                 
34 The estimate refers only to one scheme. 
35 The Romanian DGS funding is composed of an ex-ante part (at maximum equal to twice the annual contributions) and an ex-post part 
constituted by locked resources (stand-by lines) granted yearly by every member credit institution. 
36 The contribution base for UK is different from any other, and includes deposit made with: (a) an establishment of a relevant person in 
the UK, (b) a branch of a UK firm which is a credit institution established in another EEA State under an EEA right.  
37 The maximum amount of available resources for NO is not exactly twice the size of the fund since the former is referred to 2005. 
Moreover, there occurred a small change in the exchange rate NOK/EUR. 
Table 7: Description of available resources, borrowing, and comparison between the robustness indicators with and without 
unlimited borrowing. 
 B D E F 
 Description of available resources (excluding borrowing when unlimited) 
Robustness 
indicator  
(without unlimited 
borrowing) 
Borrowing 
Description 
Extended robustness 
indicator  
(including unlimited 
borrowing) 
BE Fund + guarantees + 2 annual contribution 83.48% Not allowed 83.48% 
BG Fund + maximum extra contribution N.A. Unlimited 100.00% 
CZ Estimated borrowing approx. equal to 10 years income (syndicated loan+ bond) 80.00% 
Limit not regulated, 
estimated by DGS 80.00% 
DK Fund + maximum contribution N.A. Unlimited 100.00% 
DE N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
EE 2007 Fund 71.43% Unlimited 100.00% 
IE Fund + max. contribution based on eligible N.A. Not allowed28 N.A. 
GR Fund + contribution + extra contributions 46.34% Unlimited 100.00% 
ES Fund + maximum contribution N.A. Unlimited 100.00% 
FR Fund N.A. Unlimited 100.00% 
IT Total virtual funds32 of the 2 DGS 90.50% Not allowed 90.50% 
CY total assets + max. borrowing + max. contribution aggregated over the 2 DGS 37.36% Limited by regulation 37.36%
 
LV Fund 25.45% Not allowed 25.45% 
LT 2007 Fund N.A. Unlimited 100.00% 
LU N.A. N.A. Not regulated N.A. 
HU Fund + maximum loan 95.61% Limit not regulated,  estimated by DGS 95.61% 
MT Fund + maximum  borrowing 0.00% Limited by regulation 0.00% 
NL N.A. N.A. Not allowed29 N.A. 
AT N.A. N.A. Unlimited 100.00% 
PL Fund N.A. Unlimited 100.00% 
PT Own funds aggregated over the two DGS 3487.76% Unlimited 100.00% 
RO Own funds + stand-by lines
35 + 
extraordinary contributions  81.25% Unlimited 100.00% 
SI Virtual fund32 N.A. Unlimited 100.00% 
SK N.A. N.A. Unlimited 100.00% 
FI Liquidation of the DGS assets and estimated borrowing 76.92% 
Limit not regulated,  
estimated by DGS 76.92% 
SE Fund + maximum contribution N.A. Unlimited 100.00% 
UK 0.3% of the contribution base36 N.A. Unlimited 100.00% 
EU Aver.  64.68%  86.49% 
NO Twice the fund minimum level 98.58% Limited 98.58% 
Source: Survey data and 2006 survey data. 
 
Note that for some MS (EE, GR, PT, and RO) the values of the robustness and extended robustness indicators differ: this 
relates to the fact that for these MS the borrowing is in principle unlimited (i.e. extended robustness indicator equals 100%) 
but the DGS provided an estimate of the maximum size of loans affordable in practice (robustness indicator lower than 
100%). Lastly note that for all other MS declaring an unlimited borrowing capacity, which did not provide any potential bound 
for the size of the borrowing, the value of the extended robustness indicator is set to 100%. This number would suggest 
significant robustness of the schemes to cover any bank failure. In practice, this declaration may be viewed as hypothetical, 
considering that in case of high impact interventions other authorities (Government or Central Bank) would be likely to step 
in, by providing guarantees38 or acting directly to preserve financial stability. 
 
3.4 Payout delays 
Particular attention has been given, by the Commission, in the investigation of payout delays in cases of depositor 
reimbursements. A specific Working Group of EFDI is dealing with this issue, based on the statistical analysis produced by 
JRC using data collected through the survey. For this reason, only a few statistics will be presented, leaving scope for 
further discussion to the EFDI Working Group. 
The first information DGS were asked to supply is a general description of the time limit to repay depositors, and the time to 
start and complete the payout process. Directive 94/19/EC introduces a three-month limit to complete the repayment of 
depositors, giving the possibility to DGS to ask for an extension of a further 3 months, a maximum of 2 times. Based on 
survey data, Figure 9 shows the percentage of cases where this option has been used by the DGS. 
Yes (15%)
No payout until now (36%)
N.A. (8%)No (41%)
 
Figure 9: Extension of the three months time limit. 
 
The possibility of extending the payout deadline leads to a limit of 9 months to complete the payout. Considering that the 
procedural steps necessary to start the process can take a few weeks, an operative maximum delay of around one year has 
in some cases been reached. However, in practice, the majority of repayments were made in a shorter time period. An 
overview on the limits for lodging a claim with the DGS is presented in Figure 10. 
 
                                                 
38 For more details on guarantees, please refer to Appendix III of the 2006 Report.  
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Figure 10: Limits set in MS Regulations to present a claim against a failed bank 
 
In some cases the time interval is related to the entire liquidation procedure which starts after the bank failure, while in other 
MS the limit is strictly referred to claims addressed to the DGS. Figure 11 and Figure 12 respectively describe the time 
needed to start and complete the payout of depositors, based on estimated average data provided by the DGS. Again, the 
overlap between repayment of depositors and liquidation procedure can introduce different time horizons: for example, the 
class “up to 5 years” refer to the so called "statute of limitation," i.e. a concrete date set by the law after which, upon expiry, 
the claimant loses all rights to claim against the debtor. As explained before, the class “up to 1 year” has been introduced in 
the classification as the sum of the 9 months extensions plus some weeks devoted to the steps necessary to start up the 
procedure. 
It is important to stress that data regarding time to start and time to complete the procedure are highly influenced by national 
laws and schemes’ statutes/bylaws: in some cases, claims can be lodged directly to the DGS within three months whilst in 
other cases claims can be advanced to the receiver over a wider time horizon, generally up to five years. It is clear that 
these differences lead to different classes shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12.  
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Figure 11: Time to start the repayment procedure. 
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Figure 12: Time to complete the repayment procedure. 
 
A more quantitative analysis of past payout delays can be found in Figure 13 and Figure 14. The first graph refers to the 
amount of deposits repaid in 3-6-9 months as a percentage of the total amount of covered deposits; the second shows the 
number of deposits repaid as a percentage of the total number of covered deposits. In the graphs, single data referring to 
interventions are plotted as crosses, while the aggregated average is drawn as a solid line. Note that the information of the 
two graphs is complementary since in many cases the number of deposits not repaid relate to extremely small amounts. 
This is evident since the amount repaid is higher than the corresponding number.  
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Figure 13: Amount of money  repaid in 3-6-9 months as a percentage of the total amount of covered deposits. 
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Figure 14: Number of depositors repaid in 3-6-9 months as a percentage of the total amount of covered deposits. 
 
As expected, both the amount and number of deposits repaid grow with time. Within 3 months over 91% of deposits have 
been repaid, and this reaches a level close to full reimbursement (around 97%) within 9 months. Concerning the number of 
reimbursed depositors, the average moves from 67% within 3 months to 78% within 9 months. It is important to stress that 
very often DGS declare an incomplete repayment after 9 months largely due to the fact that sometimes deposits are very 
small, leading respective owners not to claim the amount from the DGS. 
Another interesting case is represented by bankruptcies of DGS members for which a few deposits account for a large 
portion of the total amount to be reimbursed: in these cases, the amount exceeding the payout limit (i.e. uncovered) is vast 
with respect to that to be reimbursed (i.e. covered), leading to peculiar situations where DGS repaid for instance only 10% of 
the deposits but around 60% of the depositors. Clearly, this situation does not represent a problem of inefficiency of the 
DGS, suggesting the need to carefully read the data in regard to repaid depositors. 
To aid understanding of possible causes driving DGS inefficiency, the schemes were asked to identify relevant variables 
(including bilateral/topping-up agreements, data on deposits, immediate availability of funds, trained workforce, or other 
issues) influencing the promptness of repayments (see Figure 15). Since more than one choice was possible, the figures 
refer to the number of times each class was selected. Note that around half of the schemes declared that all the factors 
identified in the survey (bilateral/topping-up agreements, data on deposits, immediate availability of funds and trained 
workforce) can potentially speed up the reimbursement of depositors.  
                   
Data on deposits (18%)
Data on deposits, workforce (7%)
N.A. (13%)
Availability of funds, data on deposits (13%)
All (49%)
 
Figure 15: Variables influencing the promptness of repayments. 
 
The availability of data on deposits is identified as the primary cause influencing the speed of reimbursements. With this in 
mind, consider the situation described in Figure 16, which describes access DGS have to relevant data. Significantly, 
around 50% of the schemes cannot regularly access data. It is important to stress that current operative rules within DGS 
are clearly influenced by the structure and functioning of schemes: ex-post scheme do not generally ask for info periodically, 
whereas schemes embedded in the Central Bank have unrestricted access to every kind of data.  
With respect to deposits, in the case of payout, the DGS is, in all MS, in charge of verifying data on depositors to determine 
the eligibility of the claim and the covered amount. In most cases the Statutes of the DGS do not specify a determined time 
limit for this step of the process. However, in some specific cases there is a limit ranging from 10-20 days (BG, PL, SI), up to 
3 months (LU). 
 
 
N.A. (8%)
Other (5%)
Yes, on request (20%)
YES, periodically (5%)
YES, periodically, on request, 
in case of intervention (13%)
No, only in case of 
intervention (49%)
 
Figure 16: Description of the way DGS can access their members’ data. 
4. Cross border exposure 
 
In this section a brief overview of the data collected through the survey on DGS cross border exposures is presented. 
Topping-up issues are not included in the following discussion, since an EFDI Working Group is currently dealing with this 
subject. 
In the survey DGS were asked to specify the amount of eligible deposits and split this figure between their local members, 
EU branches and non-EU branches.39 In the survey, and in the remainder of this Report, "local members" shall refer to 
members under the prudential supervision of the country where the DGS is set up; "EU branch" shall refer to a branch of a 
credit institution from a EU MS, under the prudential supervision of the home-country; "non-EU branch" shall refer to a 
branch of a third country in one of the EU MS. Concerning local members, DGS were also asked to provide information 
about their subsidiaries (for definitions see also Annex VI). The following, discusses the relative importance of branches with 
respect to local members, together with a small paragraph on local members classified as subsidiaries. 
This analysis does not cover branches which are set in countries with a lower scope or level of coverage: these branches 
will not be part of the host-country DGS and do not represent a “real” cross border exposure since in the event of 
intervention only the home-country DGS would be involved. However, it is expected that the size of the market covered by 
these branches will be relevant, especially when considering EU-15 branches in EU-12 countries. The absence of a 
complete picture of EU branches causes problems in the definition of the scenario that considers branches of one MS in 
another MS (see Section 5.2). Considering the amount of available information, a fictitious scenario will be designed. 
All available information on the partition of the amount of eligible deposits is presented in Table 8: data is first reported as 
total amounts of deposits for each class (local members, EU branches, and non-EU branches) and then as percentages, in 
order to give an initial insight into the respective importance of each class. As before, the analysis has been performed 
taking the eligible deposits as a base, estimating values in cases where DGS did not provide the split of the total amount of 
eligible deposits between local, EU branches and non-EU braches. Where the scheme was able to provide the split for the 
amount of total or covered deposits, data on eligible deposits have been approximated reflecting the same percentage split 
(i.e. DK, CY). For some countries (DE, IE, FR, NL, and UK) the split is not available, although FR declared that there are no 
branches from another EU MS in their scheme. 
The relative proportions of the different types of members in term of eligible deposits are presented in Figure 17. Note that 
the scale of the y-axis focuses on the ninth decile, since for all EU countries more than 90% of the eligible deposits are held 
in local members. Only 5 MS (BG, IT, CY, RO, SK) have less than 99% of eligible deposits kept in local members, while 10 
countries declared to having no EU or non-EU branches. The majority of "non local members" are EU branches, although in 
some cases non-EU branches can account for a non negligible part of the market of deposits. For instance, in CY non-EU 
branches account for approximately 6.5% of the total market of deposits. Regarding EU-branches, the MS with the highest 
percentage of non-local members among EU-15 is IT (around 2.4% of the market of deposits), while the MS with the highest 
percentage of non-local members among new MS is SK (around 6.1%).  
                                                 
39 According to Article 1(5) of the Directive 94/19/EC  
“'branch' shall mean a place of business which forms a legally dependent part of a credit institution and which conducts directly all or 
some of the operations inherent in the business of credit institutions; any number of branches set up in the same Member State by a 
credit institution which has its head office in another Member State shall be regarded as a single branch.” 
 
Table 8: Analysis of eligible deposits for local members, EU and non-EU branches. 
 Amount of eligible 
deposits of local 
members (€) 
Amount of eligible 
deposits of EU 
branches(€) 
Amount of eligible 
deposits of non-EU 
branches(€) 
% of local 
members 
% of EU 
branches 
% of non-EU 
branches 
BE 215 223 146 822 0 203 853 178 99.91% 0.00% 0.09% 
BG 9 299 712 723 250 943 107 168 050 912 95.69% 2.58% 1.73% 
CZ 57 754 000 000 189 000 000 0 99.67% 0.33% 0.00% 
DK (*)127 559 398 873 (*)1 034 411 019 0 99.20% 0.80% 0.00% 
DE N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
EE 4 282 880 626 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
IE N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
GR 118 549 812 674 0 185 794 331 99.84% 0.00% 0.16% 
ES 636 108 269 000 0 430 153 000 99.93% 0.00% 0.07% 
FR N.A. 0 N.A. N.A. 0.00% N.A. 
IT 568 596 416 000 14 050 000 000 428 100 000 97.52% 2.41% 0.07% 
CY (*)29 009 701 246 0 (*)2 020 671 670 93.49% 0.00% 6.51% 
LV 8 606 405 361 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
LT 7 077 913 867 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
LU 89 053 647 000 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
HU 36 787 544 187 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
MT 5 705 739 132 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
NL N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
AT 185 000 000 000 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PL 94 801 323 834 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PT 123 885 838 000 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
RO 11 425 977 162 593 238 532 29 213 464 94.83% 4.92% 0.24% 
SI 12 467 745 896 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
SK 10 310 586 061 671 462 513 0 93.89% 6.11% 0.00% 
FI 80 361 942 078 129 841 597 85 423 672 99.73% 0.16% 0.11% 
SE 115 745 113 703 0 0 100% 0.00% 0.00% 
UK N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
NO 120 100 187 852 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Source: Survey data; (*) Estimation from the same proportions (between local, EU branches and non-EU branches) coming from information 
on total or covered deposits. 
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Figure 17: Proportion of EU (grey bars) and non-EU branches (dark bars) respect to local members (light grey bars) for those 
MS providing data. For countries labelled with a star data have been estimated from the dataset. 
 
DGS were also asked to provide information about the importance of subsidiaries among their local members. Although 
definitions of branch and subsidiary were attached to the survey in the file of definitions (see Annex VI), DGS encountered 
some problems in understanding what data was requested and in many cases this problem resulted in a declaration of 
unavailability of information. Despite the clarifications provided for in the EFDI Annual Meeting, the dataset could only be 
corrected and completed, with additional information, to a limited extent40. Data on subsidiaries was not available for 13 MS, 
noticeably all but one (PL) from the EU-15. 
Figure 18 plots the relative weights of the eligible deposits of subsidiaries in terms of the eligible deposits of the local 
members. Excluding CY, which declared that there are no subsidiaries among their local members, all other MS not shown 
in the figure did not provide any information on subsidiaries. This information is the most interesting, giving a rough proxy of 
the power of foreign banking systems in each EU country. Since subsidiaries are characterized by a great part of their 
capital coming from abroad, the percentages in the last column provide a measure of possible contagion between different 
banking systems (e.g. a major bank failure could lead to a failure of their subsidiaries in other MS). However, note that this 
phenomenon cannot be considered as a cross-border exposure, since supervisory and legal responsibilities lie in the 
country where the subsidiary is set and a failure will not drive the intervention of any DGS from another MS.  
Figure 18 shows that situations within EU countries are very different and that the presence of subsidiaries is much more 
enhanced in EU-12 countries. In fact, the weight of the subsidiaries for 2 out of the 3 EU-15 countries providing data (ES, IT) 
                                                 
40 In case the Commission will be interested in investigating more thoroughly the role of subsidiaries in the EU banking system, 
supplementary information could be collected. 
lies between 1% and 2%. The only EU-15 MS where a relevant portion of the market of deposits is represented by 
subsidiaries is PT (around 16%).  
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Figure 18: Eligible deposits of subsidiaries as a percentage of the total eligible deposits of local members. 
 
Regarding EU-12 data, subsidiaries represent a notable share of the market of deposits, thus highlighting the substantial 
role of EU-15 banks in acquiring significant quotas of the EU-12 banking systems. With the exclusion of CY (which declares 
zero subsidiaries), MT and CZ (where the portion of the deposits’ market covered by subsidiaries is less than 3%), the 
importance of subsidiaries in the other new MS ranges between 21% and more than 95% in EE and SK, respectively. 
5. Interventions scenario analysis  
 
Aim of this Section is to develop scenario analyses exploring the impact of a financial crisis on the system of EU DGS. In the 
first part of this section, historical reimbursements and preventive interventions experienced in the EU will be analyzed and 
compared. This data will be subsequently used to define the scenarios. Finally results of the scenario analysis will be 
presented and discussed. 
 
5.1 Analysis of historical intervention 
This paragraph focuses on the description of the interventions faced by the EU DGS after the implementation of Directive 
94/19/EC. In the survey each DGS was asked to provide qualitative and quantitative data on the 10 most recent 
interventions between 1994 and 200641. For each intervention the DGS were asked to declare the year of the intervention, 
describe if the intervention was related to a default or not, and quantify the encountered costs. In particular, the schemes 
were asked to detail the amount of administrative costs related to each intervention, to indicate whether the costs where 
entirely paid by the DGS or in part covered by third parties, and finally to specify the amount of funds recovered (if any) 
during the liquidation procedure. Developing and fine-tuning the complete interventions dataset presented a number of 
problems. Some countries supplied data aggregating all interventions in a specific year (PL42) or provided the total amount 
of costs from the date of failure up to current date, without specifying the percentage of reimbursed depositors (UK43). 
Finally, most of the DGS encountered problems in specifying the administrative costs of the interventions and the amount of 
recovered funds. Note that for DE no data on interventions is available: DE1 declared that no intervention has occurred until 
now; DE3 did not provide any data due to confidentiality reasons, although this scheme has carried out preventive 
interventions; DE2 and DE4 did not reply to the survey. 
The complete dataset is presented in Annex IV of the Report, where the first table, IV-1, focuses on cases where the DGS 
classified the intervention as a payout of depositor, while the second table, IV-2, presents data for other types of 
interventions (mainly preventive). Both tables describe the interventions specifying the year, the total costs, the impact of the 
intervention (defined below) and, in case of failure, the recovery rate. The last column includes some notes on each 
intervention provided by the DGS. The third column of Table IV-2 also specifies whether or not the involved institution failed. 
Figure 19 plots the number of interventions per year from 1994 to 2006, distinguishing between payout of depositors (solid 
line) and other types of interventions (dotted line). Concerning payouts of depositors, on average 5 interventions per year 
occurred, with a total of 67 interventions, of which 37 were in the EU-15 and 30 in the EU-12. Among the EU-15 MS, 22 
cases took place in the UK. However, these mainly concerned small credit unions. A broad peak is visible in 2003, with a 
                                                 
41 Although 12 MS joined the EU only in 2004 and 2007, the same time horizon has been chosen for all countries. 
42 Following a request of the Polish DGS, data on interventions for PL are treated as confidential. 
43 The reason why data on the costs are referred to date is due to the fact that in the UK there is no limit of time for the claim of 
depositors. The UK DGS declared that in all cases the payouts were related to very small Credit Unions operating in local areas, for the 
most part run by volunteers. For these reasons, the UK DGS declared difficulty in providing data on the total amount of covered 
deposits, needed to understand if the incurred costs are almost 100% or lower. For all these peculiarities these interventions are 
considered not to be representative of the UK system and, currently, corresponding data is not included in the statistics on the 
impact/costs of the payouts presented in this paragraph on historical interventions. 
total of 13 payouts. When considering other types of interventions, a mean of 2 per year is observable and all but one 
occurred in the EU-15.  
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Figure 19: Number of intervention per year. 
 
To compare the impact of these interventions, the total encountered costs (columns 3 and 4, respectively of Table IV-1 and 
Table IV-2 of Annex IV) are reported at 2005 prices44. This adjustment accounts for the change in the value of money and 
enables costs to be referred to the same year, listed in columns 4 and 5 respectively of the same tables. Unless specified, 
costs, in the remainder of the Report, will refer to those reported in 2005. 
The range of costs for payout interventions is quite broad, ranging from a minimum of around 0.006 million € (payout in RO 
in 2003) to a maximum of 470 million € (payout in CZ in 2003). The average cost of historical payouts to depositors in the 
whole EU is around 57 million €, with higher values in the EU-12 (on average 75 million €) than in the EU-15 (24 million € 
when excluding UK). For other types of interventions the range of costs is again quite broad, varying from 0.1 million € 
(support intervention in IT in 2004) to a huge restructuring intervention occurring in ES in 1994, whose costs reached 1 623 
million €. On average the costs of an intervention not classified as payout are around 90 million €. 
DGS were also asked to classify their interventions by declaring whether the defaulted or defaulting institution was a local 
member or a topping-up branch from another EU MS. Considering both databases (payout and non-payout), all 
interventions refer to local members, except one relating to a small German branch in Luxembourg. 
                                                 
44 To estimate the costs at 2005 prices the index of Harmonized Consumption Price Index available on the Annual Macro-Economic 
Database (AMECO) database developed by DG ECFIN has been applied. The database is available on-line at the following web 
address: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/annual_macro_economic_database/ameco_en.htm 
In order to fully exploit the information collected on past interventions, and use it to define the scenarios, costs have been 
compared to the size of the corresponding system of deposits. Specifically, the following ratio, which will be referred to as 
the "intensity ratio", has been defined to classify interventions: 
 
100
(2005)  deposits  eligible  ofamount    Total
2005)  to  d(actualize  oninterventi  of  costs  TotalRatio Intensity ×=           (1) 
 
The value of this ratio for each intervention is also reported in Table IV-1 and Table IV-2 of Annex IV. 
Categorizing payouts according to this ratio, accounts for the fact that an intervention of a certain amount will have different 
impacts on different MS, depending largely on the capacity of the system to absorb the costs, the bigger the system the 
smaller the impact. Note that,  in the definition of the intensity ratio it is necessary to weight costs referred to 2005 against 
the total amount of deposits of the same year.  
Using the intensity ratio, the impact of actual payouts have been classified as high (intensity ratio greater or equal than 0.5), 
medium (intensity ratio between 0.05 and 0.5), and small (intensity ratio smaller or equal than 0.05). Using this 
categorization, the database is composed of 7 payouts with high impact (all happened in the EU-12 countries), 13 of 
medium impact (all happened between 1995 and 2005 in the EU-12), while the remaining 24 payouts result to have a small 
impact (UK excluded). The range of variation between the highest and lowest intensity ratios is extremely broad, ranging 
from a minimum of 0.00005 (payout in RO in 2003) to 3.24  (payout in SK in 2001). In other terms the minimum and 
maximum costs of previous interventions are respectively 0.00005% and 3.24% of the total amount of eligible deposits of 
the corresponding systems.  
Regarding preventive interventions, they are equally apportioned between medium impact (10 out of 25) and low impact (14 
out of 25). Intensity ratios vary in this case between 0.0002 and 0.73, the average being around 0.12. 
The dataset shows that in a few cases, failures drove reimbursements of very high costs. On one hand this fact seems to 
suggest that the financial stability of the EU banking system has, so far, not been profoundly undermined; on the other hand, 
the absence of severe, recurrent failures precludes the possibility to assess the consequences of a more severe crisis of the 
EU banking system. These remarks were taken into account in the construction of the scenarios in the next section. 
5.2 Scenarios definition 
In order to assess the capability of the EU DGS system to deal with payouts/interventions of different sizes, a number of 
scenarios have been built, each scenario characterized by a different intensity ratio. To obtain the impact of each scenario in 
a MS, the corresponding costs are estimated by multiplying the intensity ratio set in the scenario by the total amount of 
eligible deposits of the MS under discussion and then dividing by 100 (see Equation (1) above). Further, to evaluate if 
current systems of DGS are capable of absorbing such events, scenarios’ costs are compared to the 2005 available funds 
(if any). Three different payout scenarios based on historical data have been considered, one for each class of intensity:  
1) Scenario 1: high-impact scenario with an intensity ratio of 3.24, corresponding to the highest impact available in the 
database. This scenario represents a failure which occurred in a EU-12 country in 2003. 
2) Scenario 2: medium-impact scenario with an intensity ratio of 0.81, representing a failure of intermediate size which 
occurred in a EU-12 country in 2003; 
3) Scenario 3: low-impact scenario with an intensity ratio of 0.035, describing the highest available historical failure in 
a country of the EU-15; 
Moreover, a fourth scenario (Scenario 4) based on the historical database of interventions other than payouts has been 
considered, namely a preventive scenario with a medium intensity ratio of 0.16, which is close to the average intensity ratio 
of preventive interventions. 
The original scope of the scenario analysis included the assessment of the capacity of the EU MS to face a payout involving 
the failure of a credit institution with branches in another EU MS (most likely with very high impact). However, as stressed 
above, a database of cross-border interventions is not available. Moreover, as already stressed in Section 4, it is expected 
that the real importance of branches in other EU MS will be much higher than the one described in the constructed dataset. 
In fact, whenever the scope or level of coverage in the host-country is lower or equal to the one of the home-country, it is not 
necessary for the branch to become a member of the host DGS for topping-up purposes. All costs of possible interventions 
will be covered by the home-country DGS. In this situation, which covers for instance the cases of EU-15 DGS in a EU-12 
country with level of coverage set to the minimum, the host-country DGS does not have any data on the size of the deposits 
at the branches. Similarly, it is  impossible to extrapolate the size of the market of branches from home-country DGS data, 
since they are classified as local members. For these reasons it is impossible to build a scenario involving the failure of a 
credit institution with branches in another EU MS, from historical data.  
A fictitious scenario (Scenario 5) has been built in order to assess the consequences of a very high impact scenario with a 
failure of a credit institution in one MS with a branch in a second MS. In this scenario it is hypothesized that the bank covers 
3% of the market in its home-country in terms of eligible deposits. It is also assumed that the branch can only be set in one 
MS and that the segment of the market in the host-country, covered by the branch, depends on whether the home-country 
and/or the host-country are in the EU-15 or in the EU-12, as specified in Table 9. This means, for instance, that when a MS 
of the EU-15 is considered as the home-country and a MS of the EU-12 as a host-country, the branch will cover 2% of the 
host-country market in terms of the total amount of eligible deposits.  
 
Table 9: Share(% of eligible deposits) of the host-country market covered by the branch in the fourth scenario.  
 Host-Country EU-15 Host-Country EU-12 
Home-Country EU-15 1.0% 2.0% 
Home-Country EU-12  0.1% 0.5% 
 
Further, as all possible combinations of home and host-countries are considered, the impact of the scenario for each 
Member State in its role as home-country will not be a single figure but a range of figures, each relating to a different host-
country. The impact of the failure of such a credit institution when fixing the home and host-countries is estimated 
numerically using the following formula: 
 
)) j deposits( eligible ofamount  (Total )) i deposits( eligible ofamount  (Total3%  j)(i, costs Total ×+×= K  
 
where “i” labels the home-country, “j” the host-country, and “k” is the share in the host-country chosen using Table 9.  
Note that this last scenario is not applied to NO.  
5.3 Results 
This section describes the results of the analysis performed considering the five scenarios defined in the previous Section. 
Table 10 shows the impact of each scenario for each EU MS by comparing its costs with the current available funds and 
contributions. In particular, the second and third columns report the 2005 funds and the maximum amount of resources for 
each country. Column 4 labels those MS where the borrowing is allowed without any limitation. Columns 5-8 list the 
estimated costs for each payout scenario (high, medium, and low impact) and for the preventive scenario; the last column 
presents average costs for the very high impact scenario. The grey rows at the bottom of the table show the average costs 
for the EU as a whole, and for the subgroups of ex-ante and ex-post schemes. The last row shows the impact for NO. 
To better understand the size of the impact of each scenario and the capacity of each MS to absorb its costs, Table 11 
shows the ratio of the estimated costs over the 2005 available funds. Note that this ratio is not available for ex-post DGS 
which do not have any reserves available, and for SK, whose fund is negative. Whenever the ratio is lower than 1, it means 
that the DGS' current funds are enough to completely cover the intervention expenditures. Conversely, a ratio bigger than 1 
implies that current funds are not sufficient to cover the expenditures and that the DGS needs to collect extra money.  
For scenario 1 (high impact) the costs vary from 0.14 to 61.85 b€, with an average impact of 8.69 b€. No scheme would 
have enough resources to face the costs of such a payout and only MS with a high coverage ratio (BG, EE, LT, PT, RO, SE) 
would have to collect less than 4 times their current funds. For EU-15 ex-ante DGS the lowest impact would be for SE 
(costs/funds = 2.24) while the highest impact would be for FR (costs/funds = 22.35). To better understand the impact of this 
scenario, note that for SE (the EU 15 MS with the highest coverage ratio) current contributions are around 1/30 of current 
available funds. For EU-12 ex-ante DGS the payout would affect CY45 (costs/funds = 129.56) and MT (costs/funds = 61.02) 
the most and LT (costs/funds = 1.41) the least. The high impact for CY and MT stresses the very low coverage ratio of these 
two MS (see Table 5) and the low ex-ante component of their funding mechanisms. When excluding these two MS, the 
remaining EU ex-ante schemes would have to collect on average around 7 times their current funds to meet the costs of the 
payout. If instead MT and CY are included, the average rises to 16 times. Finally, concerning ex-post schemes the costs 
range from 0.4 (SI) to 35.32 b€ (UK), with an average of 13.18 b€.  
For scenario 2 (medium impact), 7 MS (BG, EE, ES, LT, PT, RO, and SE) would have enough ex-ante funds to cope with 
the reimbursement without the need to collect any additional contributions. Including all financial means available (ex-ante 
funds, ex-post contributions and additional limited borrowing, eventually unlimited), it appears that 6 MS are not equipped to 
deal with a mid-sized failure. In the remaining MS (as far as data are available) DGS appear capable of dealing with such a 
failure either because of their additional resources or because of unlimited borrowing facilities. On average, ex-ante EU 
schemes would need around 4 times their present funds to tackle the compensation of depositors. Excluding CY and MT, 
ex-ante schemes would have to raise between 1 to 3 times their current funds to cover the repayment expenditures. Costs 
in this scenario lie between 0.035 and 15.49 b€, with an average 2.18 b€. 
                                                 
45 Note that for CY the total amount of eligible deposits has not been provided by the DGS but estimated as explained Section 2. For this 
reason results for this country have to be read carefully. 
For scenario 3, as expected, the impact is low and all MS funded ex-ante except, CY (costs/funds = 1.41), would be able to 
handle the crisis using current funds. For ex-post DGS, costs vary between 0.004 (SI) and 0.38 b€ (UK), the average being 
0.14 b€, values which are below the average EU 2005 funds. 
For scenario 4 (preventive) results lie in between the ones of scenarios 2 (medium impact) and 3 (low impact), discussed 
above. The costs for this scenario vary between 0.007 and 3.13 b€, with an average of 0.44 b€. Only three ex-ante MS (FR, 
CY, MT) would have to gather funds to cope with the costs of such preventive intervention. The overall EU average of this 
ratio is approximately 0.82, the higher burden being related again to CY and MT. Excluding these countries, the remaining 
ex-ante schemes would use on average only around one third of their current funds to handle such a preventive intervention 
(costs/funds = 0.35). 
When considering the maximum amount of available resources (excluding borrowing, if unlimited, for details see also  
 
 
Table 6 and Table 7) instead of current funds, the situation changes slightly for some MS. In the EU-15 the most 
remarkable difference occurs for FI, which declares to be able to collect a maximum amount of available resources up to 
more than 10 times their current funds by liquidating the DGS assets and borrowing money. With this amount of funds, FI 
would even be able to face the high impact scenario's costs. For the EU-12, BG and CZ show the most evident increases; in 
fact, summing current funds and estimated extraordinary contributions, BG would also nearly be able to cope with the costs 
of the high impact scenario.  
It goes without saying that all DGS that have access to unlimited borrowing (see Table 7 and Table 10) would theoretically 
be capable to absorb even the high impact scenario. In practice, this declaration may be viewed as hypothetical, considering 
that in case of high impact interventions other authorities (Government or Central Bank) would be likely to step in, by 
providing guarantees or acting directly to preserve financial stability. 
Figure 20 and Figure 21 shows, in histogram-plots, the costs of each scenario 1-4 for each MS compared to the size of 
available funds, if any. The two plots in Figure 20 refer to EU-15 countries while those in  Figure 21 describe EU-12 MS: EU 
countries are ranked in descending order of costs for scenario 1, and the scales of all 4 plots are extremely different, due to 
the high variation of the costs in the various countries. Different scales have been adopted in order to make small bars 
visible and comparable, otherwise they would collapse to zero. Note that Germany has not been plotted since only partial 
data on 1 of 4 DGS was available.  
The Figures can help when assessing the impact of each scenario by comparing the amount of current funds (rightmost 
white bar) with the costs of each scenario. The difference is evident between those countries with a high coverage ratio (SE 
PT, ES for EU-15 and LT, BG, EE for EU-12, see Table 5), where current funds are often comparable to the expenditure in 
the scenarios, and the remaining MS, where the difference between current funds and scenarios’ costs can be significant. 
 
Table 10: 2005 fund, maximum amount of resources and costs for each scenario in t€. For the scenario 5 average costs are reported. 
 
2005 
Fund 
(t€) 
Maximum 
amount of 
resources 
(excluding 
unlimited 
borrowing) 
(t€) 
Unlimited 
Borrowing 
Costs 
Scenario 1 
high  
(t€) 
Costs 
Scenario 2 
medium  
(t€) 
Costs 
Scenario 3 
low  
(t€) 
Costs 
Scenario 4 
preventive  
(t€) 
Mean Costs 
Scenario 5 
very high  
(t€) 
BE 713 000 824 000  6 971 484 1 746 173 75 762 352 810 16 062 519  
BG 153 884 (#)299 664 X 314 509 78 776 3 418 15 917 1 257 956  
CZ 177 900 1 100 000  1 875 107 469 665 20 378 94 895 2 704 685  
DK 475 839 (#)784 116 X 4 161 454 1 042 335 45 224 210 601 13 457 523  
DE N.A. N.A.  61 854 488 15 492 918 672 200 3 130 304 62 841 573  
EE 66 000 95 867 X 138 599 34 715 1 506 7 014 1 098 439  
IE 337 500 (#)693 394  5 758 583 1 442 373 62 581 291 428 14 938 118  
GR 688 487 1 219 051 X 3 842 431 962 428 41 757 194 456 13 161 777  
ES 5 214 864 (#)6 487 940 X 20 599 169 5 159 549 223 860 1 042 473 28 695 861  
FR 1 475 000 (#)1 475 000 X 32 959 204 8 255 412 358 182 1 667 984 40 154 047  
IT (*)0 1 987 362  18 869 011 4 726 190 205 058 954 914 27 091 944  
CY 7 751 85 650  1 004 181 251 521 10 913 50 819 1 897 306  
LV 49 541 (#)49 541  278 514 69 760 3 027 14 095 1 224 587  
LT 162 663 213 130 X 229 050 57 371 2 489 11 592  1 178 733  
LU (*)0 N.A.  2 881 886 721 836 31 319 145 845 12 271 318  
HU 228 880 317 750  1 190 490 298 186 12 938 60 248 2 070 022  
MT 3 026 4 200  184 645 46 249 2 007 9 344 1 137 567  
NL (*)0 N.A.  15 609 216 3 909 697 169 632 789 944 24 069 999  
AT (*)0 N.A. X 5 986 828 1 499 543 65 061 302 979 15 149 709  
PL 358 479 358 479 X 3 067 888 768 425 33 340 155 258  3 810 435  
PT 1 226 218 (#)1 761 283 X 4 009 099 1 004 174 43 569 202 891 13 316 284  
RO 143 661 (#)507 292 X 389 902 97 660 4 237 19 732 1 327 848  
SI (*)0 189 022 X 403 472 101 059 4 385 20 419 1 340 428  
SK -78 974 N.A. X 355 393 89 016  3 862  17 986  1 295 857  
FI 375 000 5 000 000 X 2 607 578 653 130 28 338 131 963 12 017 025  
SE 1 672 259 (#)1 750 844 X 3 745 655 938 188 40 706 189 558 13 072 062  
UK46 (*)0 3 900 000 X 35 322 054 8 847 243 383 860 1 787 562 42 344 492  
EU 
Aver.   
 8 689 255  2 176 429  94 430  439 742  13 666 226  
Ex-ante 
Aver.   
 7 406 544  1 855 144  80 490  374 827  11 748 582  
Ex-post 
Aver.   
 13 178 745  3 300 928  143 219  666 944  20 377 982  
NO 1 953 663 4 132 749  3 886 590 973 488 42 237 196 691 (§)Not app. 
Source: Survey data; (*) Ex-post schemes; (#) Data estimated by JRC using all available information; (§) Methodology not applied to NO. 
                                                 
46 Considering that UK has been classified as an-post system, the fund inherited from the previous scheme by the English DGS is 
considered as negligible in the present analysis.  
 
Table 11: 2005 fund and ratios cost / fund for each scenario. For scenario 5 the average ratio is reported.  
 
2005 
Fund 
(t€) 
Ratio 
Scenario 1 
high  
Ratio 
Scenario 2 
medium 
Ratio 
Scenario 3 
low 
Ratio 
Scenario 4 
preventive 
Mean Ratio 
Scenario 5 
very high 
BE 713 000 9.78 2.45 0.11 0.49 22.53 
BG 153 884 2.04 0.51 0.02 0.10 8.17 
CZ 177 900 10.54 2.64 0.11 0.53 15.20 
DK 475 839 8.75 2.19 0.10 0.44 28.28 
DE N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
EE 66 000 2.10 0.53 0.02 0.11 16.64 
IE 337 500 17.06 4.27 0.19 0.86 44.26 
GR 688 487 5.58 1.40 0.06 0.28 19.12 
ES 5 214 864 3.95 0.99 0.04 0.20 5.50 
FR 1 475 000 22.35 5.60 0.24 1.13 27.22 
IT (*)0 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
CY 7 751 129.56 32.45 1.41 6.56 244.79 
LV 49 541 5.62 1.41 0.06 0.28 24.72 
LT 162 663 1.41 0.35 0.02 0.07 7.25 
LU (*)0 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
HU 228 880 5.20 1.30 0.06 0.26 9.04 
MT 3 026 61.02 15.28 0.66 3.09 375.95 
NL (*)0 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
AT (*)0 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
PL 358 479 8.56 2.14 0.09 0.43 10.63 
PT 1 226 218 3.27 0.82 0.04 0.17 10.86 
RO 143 661 2.71 0.68 0.03 0.14 9.24 
SI (*)0 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
SK -78 974 (#)Not app. (#)Not app. (#)Not app. (#)Not app. (#)Not app. 
FI 375 000 6.95 1.74 0.08 0.35 32.05 
SE 1 672 259 2.24 0.56 0.02 0.11 7.82 
UK (*)0 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Ex-ante Aver. 517 726  16.25 4.07 0.18 0.82 48.38 
NO 1 953 663 1.99 0.50 0.02 0.10 (§)Not app. 
Source: Survey data; (*) Ex-post schemes; (#) Ratio not applicable to SK since the fund is negative; (§) 
Methodology not applied to NO. 
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Figure 20: Costs of scenarios 1-4 compared to current funds and maximum resources available for EU-15 MS. 
Note that the scale of the two plots are different; an asterisk labels DGS which are allowed to borrow and there is a maximum 
amount set/estimated; a hat labels DGS where borrowing is allowed and unlimited (see Table 7). 
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Figure 21: Costs of scenarios 1-4 compared to current funds and maximum resources available for EU-12 MS.  
Note that the scale of the two plots are different; an asterisk labels DGS which are allowed to borrow and there is a maximum 
amount set/estimated; a hat labels DGS where borrowing is allowed and unlimited (see Table 7). 
 
The very high impact scenario, Scenario 5, involving the failure of a credit institution with branches in another MS, has a 
much greater effect than scenario 1, with costs ranging from around 1 to almost 63 b€, with an average of approximately 13 
b€. The average impact of this scenario on the various countries is diverse. The ratio of costs/funds for the EU-15 ex-ante 
schemes varies between 5.5 (ES) to 44.26 (IE), with an average of around 22. Excluding CY and MT, for the ex-ante EU-12 
countries, the ratio has a slightly lower spread, with the minimum and maximum ratios at 7.25 (LT) and 24.72 (LV), 
respectively.  
Figure 22 (EU-15) and Figure 23 (EU-12) plot the entire spectrum of possible costs for each MS, the variation dependant 
upon the choice of the host-country. The black dots in each bar represents the average costs presented in the last column 
of Table 10. Note that the minimum cost depends upon both the size of the market in the home-country and the minimum 
costs related to the branch in the other EU MS, which corresponds, for all countries, to a branch in EE (the country with the 
smallest amount of eligible deposits47). The bigger the size of the home-country market of eligible deposits (DE, UK, FR in 
the EU-15 or CZ and PL in the EU-12), the less relevant the impact of the branch abroad. Similarly, the maximum costs 
depend upon the highest possible size of the branch abroad. Since the percentage of exposure is fixed for all MS (1% for 
the EU-15 MS and 0.1% for the EU-12), this corresponds to a branch in DE, the country with the highest amount of eligible 
deposits in the EU48. Excluding the biggest markets (DE, UK, FR in the EU-15, CZ and PL in the EU-12) the minimum and 
maximum costs range on average between 7.42 and 26.45 b€ for the EU-15; and between 0.43 and 2.32 b€ for new MS. 
Results for this scenario can also be read as a percentage of the amount of eligible deposits, i.e. in terms of the intensity 
ratio, in Table 12. Clearly the minimum intensity ratio is very close to 3, representing the home-country market exposure. 
The maximum reaches as high as 25 in the EU-15 (FI) and almost 50 in the EU-12 (EE). The two averages (across home 
countries) for the maximum intensity ratio are respectively 13.17 for EU-15 and 20.69 for EU-12. Regarding average 
intensity across host countries, the minimum is in DE (3.29), the maximum in EE (25.65) while the average (over home 
countries) is around 9.81. 
To correctly understand the huge impact of this scenario, these figures have to be interpreted in terms of eligible deposits. 
On average, the costs for this scenario refer to a major crisis involving about 10% of the eligible deposits in a country. 
However this percentage can reach a maximum of 50% of  the market of eligible deposits.  
Finally note once more that whilst all other scenarios are based on previous banking failures, Scenario 5 has been explicitly 
designed as a fictitious scenario reflecting the importance of branches of credit institutions of a MS in another MS, a 
phenomenon which is becoming more common in recent years. Results show that the consequences of such a scenario 
might threaten the stability of the banking system in any EU MS.  
 
 
                                                 
47 The minimum cross border impact for EE corresponds instead to MT. 
48 The maximum cross border impact for DE corresponds instead to UK. 
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Figure 22: Range of costs for the very high impact Scenario 5 in the EU-15. 
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Figure 23: Range of costs for the very high impact Scenario 5 in the EU-12. 
 
Table 12: Minimum, maximum and average intensity ratios for the very high 
impact Scenario 5. 
 
Minimum  
Intensity 
Ratio 
Maximum  
Intensity Ratio 
Mean  
Intensity Ratio 
BE 3.04 11.87 7.46 
BG 3.22 22.67 12.94 
CZ 3.04 6.30 4.67 
DK 3.07 17.86 10.47 
DE 3.00 3.57 3.29 
EE 3.67 47.63 25.65 
IE 3.05 13.74 8.39 
GR 3.07 19.10 11.08 
ES 3.01 6.00 4.51 
FR 3.01 4.88 3.94 
IT 3.01 6.28 4.65 
CY 3.07 9.16 6.11 
LV 3.25 25.21 14.23 
LT 3.30 30.00 16.65 
LU 3.10 24.46 13.78 
HU 3.06 8.20 5.63 
MT 3.38 36.50 19.94 
NL 3.02 6.96 4.99 
AT 3.05 13.33 8.19 
PL 3.02 5.02 4.02 
PT 3.07 18.43 10.75 
RO 3.18 18.86 11.02 
SI 3.17 18.33 10.75 
SK 3.19 20.40 11.80 
FI 3.11 26.72 14.91 
SE 3.07 19.51 11.29 
UK 3.01 4.75 3.88 
EU Average 3.12 16.51 9.81 
Ex-ante Aver. 3.14 17.70 10.42 
Ex-post Aver. 3.06 12.35 7.71 
Source: Data estimated by JRC using all available information. 
6. The US system 
 
6.1 Introduction to the US system 
This chapter presents the US deposit protection system and highlights the principal differences with respect to the 
mechanisms currently adopted by the EU DGS. In particular it describes the US DGS characteristics and the procedure 
adopted in cases of failure resolution. 
The US organisation dedicated to insure deposits of banks and savings associations is the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC); the FDIC is an ex-ante mechanism covering only the depositors of banks and thrifts. The quarterly risk-
based contributions are collected and managed in advance and utilized, if necessary, by the FDIC who is usually appointed 
as receiver by the competent authority. FDIC's primary objectives are to maintain public confidence and stability, to prevent 
excessive risk taking by members, and to resolve bank failures while minimizing the community costs.  
The FDIC was created in 1933 in response to the financial crises occurred of the 1920s and early 1930s. According to its 
web site49, “since FDIC foundation no depositor has lost a single cent of insured funds, as a result of DGS’ member failure”. 
This sounds a great success considering that the 2005 level of coverage in US ($100 000 = €80 379) was around three 
times the EU average (€29 351) and that the depositors, in most of the cases, were reimbursed on the next business day. 
Nowadays the FDIC is consolidated and principally regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act50 (FDIA) of 1950 and by 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act51 (FDICIA) of 1991. In particular the latter was introduced, after 
the banking crisis of the 1980s, with the aim of appointing and regulating the role of the FDIC as receiver of failed members. 
Although joining the insurer and the receiver in a single entity simplifies the procedures; giving the responsibility of asset 
liquidation to the largest creditor is an incentive to maximize possible returns. In February 2006, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Reform Act52 (FDIRA) became law, introducing some changes in the deposit insurance system. For instance, it 
merged the two existing funds managed by the FDIC (the Bank Insurance Fund, BIF, and the Savings Association 
Insurance Fund, SAIF) into the new Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF), increased the level of coverage for certain retirement 
accounts to $250 000 (€200 948), and established a range for the Fund dimension, linked to the amount of covered 
deposits.  
The remainder of this Section illustrates quantitative data describing the FDIC, gathered on its web-site and referenced to 
2005 in order to be comparable with EU survey data. Note that the EU is considered as a single entity, aggregating all DGS, 
and no single MS is compared with the US. This choice is due to the features of the US and to the heterogeneity of the EU 
dataset, which is composed by data relating to completely different situations. First, data on the total amount of deposits, the 
level of coverage and the amount of funds collected by FDIC are presented in order to focus on the main differences with 
respect to the EU DGS; second, the procedures and the rules of the scheme in case of intervention are described.  
 
                                                 
49 FDIC web-site is: http://www.fdic.gov/index.html 
50 The FDIA is available at: http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/1000-100.html 
51 The FDICIA is reported in FDIC law at page 8549 et seq.  
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/8000-120.html 
52 The FDIR Act is accessible at:  
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ171.109.pdf 
6.2 Data on US 
Comparing US and EU data, it is necessary to pay attention to the impact of the currency exchange rate and on possible 
discrepancies in the definitions of deposits, due to the different legislations and to the dissimilar data sources. US data has 
been collected in Dollars and converted into Euros using the average exchange rate for the reference year53. This 
particularly impacts on the amounts of deposits, on the dimension of the fund, on the level of coverage discussed in this 
section, and also on the costs of interventions presented in the next paragraph.  
On the FDIC web site data on two categories of deposits can be found: “total domestic deposits” and “insured deposits”. 
Only a generic definition of “total domestic deposits” is available for the US54, referring to the rules of Consolidated Report of 
Condition55. The comparison between these values and EU data is rather delicate since it is not clear whether total domestic 
deposits are closer in definition to the EU total amount of deposits or to the eligible deposits. This problem is even more 
enhanced considering that the definition of total amount of deposits applied for the EU explicitly refers to the Directive 
94/19/EC (see Article 1(1) of the Directive and Annex VI of the present Report). Concerning the US definition of “insured 
deposits”56, it seems closer to the definition of “covered deposits” provided in Annex VI: notwithstanding the fact that they 
are not identical, the purpose of these two measures is similar, that is to assess the total area of intervention of DGS. 
Note that these problems do not affect data on the adequacy of available resources, which is linked to the size of the fund 
and to the percentage of protected deposits. Finally note that these facts have also no effects on the considerations about 
the efficiency of the schemes, are discussed in the second part of this section and which represent the main differences 
between the US and the EU systems. 
 
 
Data on deposits  
The FDIC applies different levels of coverage to different categories of deposits57, as illustrated below. The most relevant 
types of deposits are single accounts58, insured until $100 000 (€80 379) per depositor per insured bank; certain retirement 
accounts, covered until $250 000 (€200 948); and trust accounts59 insured up to $100 000 (€80 379) for each beneficiary. 
Table 13 shows different variables for US (second column) and EU DGS (third column); the percentage differences are 
shown in the last column (the reference being US).  
 
                                                 
53 The Eurostat data for the average exchange rate in 2005 is 1€ = 1.2441$ 
54 The document is available at http://www4.fdic.gov/SOD/sodHelp.asp?barItem=8#Definitions 
55 The document is available at: http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/call/crinst/399RC.pdf 
56 More details available at: http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/information/fdiciorn.html 
 
57 The level of coverage are based on FDIA (12 U.S.C. 1811 et seq.) and on the FDIC’s regulation relating to insurance coverage (12 
C.F.R. Part 330). The FDIC’s guide to Deposit Insurance Coverage is available at: 
 http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/insured/yid.pdf 
58 A single account is a deposit owned by one person. The following deposit account types are included in this ownership category: (i) 
Accounts held in one person’s name alone (ii) Accounts established for one person by an agent; (iii) Nominee, guardian, custodian, or 
conservator, including Uniform Transfers to Minors Act accounts, escrow accounts, and brokered deposit accounts (iv) Accounts held in 
the name of a business that is a sole proprietorship; (v) Accounts established for a decedent’s estate; and (vi) Any account that fails to 
qualify for coverage under another ownership category. 
59 Trust accounts are created when the account owner signs an agreement–usually part of the bank’s signature card – stating that the 
deposits are payable to one or more beneficiaries upon the owner’s death. 
Table 13: Comparison between US and EU data. 
  US EU Differences 
Population 298 986 357 491 023 535 64% 
Total amount of deposits 2005 (t€) *4 957 918 174 11 269 797 167 Not applicable 
Amount of covered deposits 2005 (t€) **3 127 490 555 4 161 594 773 33% 
Amount of covered deposits/ Total 
amount of deposits 2005 0.63 0.37 Not applicable 
Coverage level 2005 (€) 80 379 29 351 -63% 
Source: Survey data; FDIC web site; * Total Domestic Deposits; ** Insured deposits. 
 
As already outlined, the comparison between the total amount of deposits for the US and EU is not completely reliable. In 
order to get an intuitive insight in the dataset, Table 13 presents in the penultimate row the ratio of the amount of covered 
deposits over the total amount of deposits.  
Concerning cross-border exposures and topping-up, the US rules are based on the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement 
Act60. Since 1991, foreign branches are no longer able to offer deposits and to obtain deposit insurance by FDIC. Currently, 
there are only 11 foreign branches in the US; new foreign banks that want to offer retail deposits in the US are required to 
establish a subsidiary and to participate in the FDIC fund. Deposits of customers of US banks operating abroad are not 
covered unless those deposits are specifically designated as being payable in the US. This fact implies that the FDIC has a 
very low cross-border exposure and that a foreign bank has no option to follow procedures such as the EU topping-up. In 
this way the FDIC operates like a completely independent fund, without any links to foreign DGS.  
 
Data on funding 
The Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) is collected before the call for resources (ex-ante mechanism), through the assessment 
of quarterly risk-based contributions on FDIC’s members and through the earnings on the total assets managed. This fund is 
the principal instrument utilized by FDIC, in case of intervention, to ensure the guarantee on the protected deposits few days 
after the closure of the failed bank. Periodically the risk of each member is assessed, making use of different indicators, to 
create four risk categories. The system adjusts contributions by increasing the fee of those members whose risk of default is 
higher. The increase ranges between 5 and 43 cents per $100 of assessable deposits. Note that the risk-based assessment 
was introduced in the US mechanism in only 1993, and it has often been revised. 
In order to compare the level of resources in the DIF with the EU resources, only data from EU ex-ante DGS are considered, 
since funds are not collected by EU ex-post DGS. Table 14 reports the total amount of deposits, total amount of covered 
deposits, level of coverage, and size of the fund for US (second column) and for the subgroup of EU ex-ante DGS (third 
column). Note that, for the EU, data on DE (no data on funds are available) and SK (negative fund) is not included. This 
means that data of 19 out of 27 EU MS are aggregated to obtain figures in Table 14.  
 
                                                 
60 It represents the “Title II-Regulatory Improvement” of the FDICI Act of 1991. Available at: 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/8000-2500.html#8000fdi201 
Table 14: Comparison of funds and Designated Reserve Ratios between US and EU 
 US §Ex-ante EU Differences 
Total amount of deposits 2005 (t€) *4 957 918 174 3 772 068 011 Not applicable 
Covered deposits 2005 (t€) **3 127 490 555 1 604 152 713 -49% 
Fund 2005 (t€) 39 061 651 13 529 952  -65% 
Coverage level 2005 (€) 80 379 25 903 -68% 
Amount of covered deposits/ Total 
amount of deposits 2005 0.63 0.42 Not applicable 
Designated Reserve Ratio (DRR) 1.25  0.84  -33% 
Source: Survey data; FDIC web site; * Total domestic deposits; ** Insured deposits; § Data of ex-ante schemes 
without DE, SK. 
 
Note that the total amount of deposits of these schemes is only around one third of the total amount of EU deposits (see 
Table 13). This is due to the fact that DE is not included, and that some ex-post funded DGS account for a high portion of 
the total amount of deposits. For this subgroup of EU MS, the average level of coverage is lower (€25 903) compared to the 
EU average (€29 351) and thus very much lower with respect to the US level (€80 379). This fact impacts on the difference 
between the ratio of the total amount of covered deposits over the total amount of deposits in the US (63%) and in the EU 
subgroup (42%). 
The last row of the table shows the so called Designated Reserve Ratio (DRR), introduced by the FDIC in order to monitor 
the adequacy of its resources and defined as the amount of funds over the amount of covered deposits61. The US regulation 
establishes a fixed range for this ratio between 1.15 and 1.50, and allows the FDIC to manage the fund’s assets within this 
interval.   
The US DRR is higher with respect to that in the EU, not only due to the size of covered deposits but also because of the 
amount of available funds, thus highlighting that the FDIC collects more contributions compared to EU ex-ante schemes. 
Owing to the differences between DRR in the EU and US, it is clear that the outcome of an intervention of the same size 
might be completely different in the US and the EU. 
 
6.3 Efficiency of the US system 
This subsection is dedicated to the procedures applied by FDIC in case of intervention to insure deposits and eventually to 
reimburse depositors. In relation to DGS efficiency, besides the objectives of ensuring financial stability, public confidence 
and minimizing the costs of resolving failed banks, the FDIC also has the task of acting as the receiver of the liquidation 
process. The first part of the next paragraph describes the US failure resolution procedures, highlighting the main 
differences with respect to the EU: the procedures applied in the various EU MS are not recalled here (see instead Section 
3 and Annex II), since they are all quite different. This is followed by a short comparison of past interventions in the US and 
EU. 
 
                                                 
61 Note that this ratio differs from the coverage ratio of Section 2.3. which is defined in term of the amount of eligible deposits. 
Rules for intervention 
In case of intervention, the US mechanism is characterized by two specific features: the intervention of the FDIC before the 
real banking failure and its role as receiver in the liquidation process. Note that, besides the agencies in charge to officially 
declare the closure of the failing bank (chartering authorities), no other authority is generally involved in the procedure.  
Banks typically fail after a global deterioration, that implies insolvency and illiquidity, rather than after a single adverse event. 
Insolvency occurs when the value of the total assets managed by the institution is lower than the amount of its liabilities. 
Illiquidity, in the previous sections referred to as “unavailability of deposits”, occurs when a bank is not able to meet its 
current obligations to customers. In most of the cases a bank usually becomes first insolvent and then illiquid.  
When the process of deterioration starts, the US regulation requires the FDIC to initiate progressively more-stringent 
restrictions on the bank's activities (Prompt Corrective Action, PCA). The PCA stipulates that a member with a ratio of 
tangible equity over assets equal to or less than 2% have to be closed by the entity that charters the bank and which has the 
authority to revoke its license.62 In this way members can be closed before they reach book-value insolvency. 
In contrast, the EU Directive 94/19/EC refers to illiquidity, without regulating the procedure for insolvent banks. This point 
represents one of the principal differences between the US and EU legislation on DGS. Early interventions or bank 
limitations have the aim to reduce the costs of DGS repayment and the impact of the failures. The US chartering authority 
and the FDIC start their actions when the member is becoming insolvent, this is earlier than the instigation in EU DGS. A 
pre-closing period of 90 days, before the official member’s closure, is set by law. In this period the FDIC works on the 
resolution of the failure and eventually arranges the reimbursement of insured deposits.  
In relation to the role of the DGS in the US63, besides its responsibility as the deposit insurer, the FDIC is in general 
appointed as the receiver of the liquidation procedure, after the closure of the insured bank. Acting as the receiver, i.e. as 
the principal creditor, the FDIC is strongly incentivised to maximize the asset returns of the failed bank. The FDIC acts in 
concordance with the “least-cost principle” that refers to the resolution method minimizing the present value of net losses 
incurred by the deposit insurer64. Conversely, EU DGS principally act as entities only responsible for the reimbursement and 
do not take part in the member’s liquidation.  
As a receiver, the FDIC is in charge of the process of resolving a failed bank (resolution stage) and of the process of 
liquidating its assets (receivership process). In the resolution stage the FDIC values the assets, solicits bids to sell the bank 
with the least cost to the insurance fund, and reimburses the depositors. During the receivership process, the FDIC 
liquidates any remaining assets and eventually distributes proceeds. 
There are two types of possible resolution transactions: open-bank assistance (OBA) and closed-bank resolution (CBR). In 
an OBA transaction, which is used in rare situations, the FDIC provides financial assistance to the bank while it remains 
open for specific reasons. The advantage of this procedure is that it has less negative effects on the relationships between 
the banks and its customers; on the contrary it can be more costly and complex for the DGS and might increase moral 
hazard.  
                                                 
62 The chartering authority for state-chartered banks is usually the state banking department; for national banks, the Office of Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC); and for federal saving institutions, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).  
63 More details on the Failure resolution procedures are available on FDIC web-site at: 
 http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2001sep/br2001v14n1art1.pdf 
64 The only exception to the application of the least-cost principle is the so called “systematic risk exception”, i.e. the case where the 
option suggested by the least cost principle would undermine the financial stability and have negative effects on the economy. 
The standard procedure used is the CBR, where the competent office closes the credit institution and appoints the FDIC as 
the receiver. CBR can be of two kinds: Purchase-and-Assumption (P&A) transactions and deposit payoffs. In a P&A 
transaction a healthy bank purchases some or all of the assets of the failed bank and assumes some or all its liabilities. This 
procedure is often applied in case of sudden failure of a small FDIC member. A different type of P&A is the bridge-bank 
transaction, in which the FDIC acts temporarily as the acquirer, taking over the operations of the failing bank and 
maintaining the banking services for the depositors. This resolution is especially useful in particular types of situations, when 
the failing bank is large or unusually complex, or when there is no time to respect the normal procedures due to the 
unexpectedness of the failure. 
In the case of deposit payoff, no assets or liabilities are assumed by another institution: depositors are reimbursed either by 
issuing a deposited check (straight deposit payoff) or by transferring the amount of insured deposits to a bank willing to 
serve as an agent of the FDIC (insured deposit transfer). 
Thank to these procedures, in the US the insured deposits are usually available for the depositors on the next business day 
in almost every bank failure. This is a consequence of the central role of the DGS in the receivership process, which allows 
arranging the payout as soon as possible, usually with no delays.  
Another feature enhancing the efficiency of the US DGS is the way depositors are informed of the occurred failure. Besides 
the announcement via public press, the FDIC issues a letter to depositors with instructions on how to claim their money. 
Moreover, the FDIC may organize a claim team for the failed member with the tasks to meet depositors directly and to take 
information on their claims.  
Table 15 shortly summarizes the main characteristics of the US deposit insurance system. 
 
Table 15: Summary of the US system characteristics. 
  Description 
Fund mechanism Ex-ante 
Fund’s finance Quarterly members contributions and earnings on fund assets  
Risk-based A specific risk-based method through composite indicators is applied 
Competent authority The chartering authority closes the member and appoint a receiver (usually FDIC) 
Trigger event Tangible equity to total assets ratio equal to or less than 2%  
Event Notification News in the local newspaper, instructions letter to all depositors  
Types of intervention Generally closed bank resolution (purchase & assumption, deposit payoff) 
Pre-closing period FDIC works on the resolution of members for 90 days before the closure 
Reimbursement One business day 
Source: FDIC web site. 
 
Historical interventions 
This part is dedicated to compare US and EU historical interventions from 1994 to 2006. Following the procedure adopted 
for the EU, US data is referenced to 2005 values. Table 16 shows US data collected from the website and EU aggregated 
data presented in Section 5.1, comparing the number of actions of the schemes and the aggregated costs. Through the 
analysis of historical data, it is possible to investigate the DGS role in minimizing the encountered costs. 
Between 1994-2006 the FDIC performed 70 interventions all concerning failed members. In 62 cases (88%) the P&A 
procedure was applied while in 8 cases (12%) a deposit payoff was arranged. In the same period, 32% more interventions 
(92) were observed in the EU, of which 67 resulted in payouts (73%) and 25 in preventive interventions (27%). The total 
costs in the US were less than half of those in the EU, 1 548 b€ compared to 4 830 b€, that is more than the double. 
Significant information is provided by the average impact of the DGS actions shown in the last row of Table 16, defined as 
the ratio between the total estimated costs and the number of actions. The EU average impact (22 111 t€) is around 2.4 
times the US average impact (52 510 ). 
Even discarding the interventions with the highest impact (one in the US in 1999 with a weight on total costs of 28%, and 
two in the EU in 1994 and in 2003 with a weight on total costs of 43%) the EU average impact remains around twice the US 
one. However, it is questionable whether or not the early activation of the DGS in the US (i.e. when the bank becomes 
insolvent rather than when it is illiquid) reduces the average impact. In fact, if only examining the last five years, 2002-2006, 
the number of EU actions (46) were 2.5 times the number of US cases (18), while the average impact for this period was 
less in the EU (15 692 t€) than the US (20 078 t€). 
 
Table 16: Impact of past DGS actions in US and in EU. 
 
Number of FDIC 
actions  
1994-2006 
US Estimated 
costs 2005  
(t€) 
Number of EU 
DGS actions 
1994-2006 
EU Estimated 
costs 2005  
(t€) 
2006 0 0 11 39 202 
2005 0 0 7 72 746 
2004 4 2 977 10 18 421 
2003 3 53 688 15 584 638 
2002 11 304 731 3 6 824 
2001 4 217 439 2 387 533 
2000 7 25 025 7 658 512 
1999 8 479 398 9 692 076 
1998 3 176 073 6 147 066 
1997 1 3 914 3 69 586 
1996 6 47 185 9 325 747 
1995 8 86 722 6 188 256 
1994 15 150 591 4 1 640 354 
Total 1994-2006 70 1 547 743 92 4 830 961 
Average impact   22 111   52 510 
Source: Survey data; FDIC web site. 
7. Conclusions 
In its Communication on DGS in 2006, the Commission identified the need to focus on the efficiency of current EU DGS to 
face crises of varying magnitude. This Report has investigated this subject taking into consideration the various meanings 
that the word “efficiency” can have. To aid the analysis JRC built a database collecting information across EU MS on the 
way schemes would operate in cases of reimbursement of depositors, other interventions, and on how schemes have 
functioned in the past in this regard. Besides a detailed description of the ways in which DGS currently operate and an 
analysis of their effectiveness, a more quantitative analysis, aimed at investigating the capability of the EU MS to handle 
potential reimbursements of depositors of different size, has also been presented. Particular attention has been put on the 
exploration of cross-border issues, although only a limited amount of information could be gathered for this. Moreover, JRC 
also collected and analyzed data relative to historical interventions where payout delays were registered. Additional analysis 
on this subject will be produced by a dedicated EFDI Working Group. 
As mentioned above, the first part of the Report presented the manner in which DGS operate when called into action. A 
wide spectrum of information covering different aspects has been presented, such as the description of the various steps of 
the intervention procedure (both in case of payouts and for preventive interventions), the authorities involved and their 
interaction, and the way DGS manage and invest available funds. 
In general, considerably diverse results were obtained across the EU countries, leading to difficulties in drawing general and 
harmonized conclusions. This is also evident from descriptions of the intervention procedures provided by each DGS and 
attached in Annex II. This diversity is likely to have an impact on the rapidity of payment and the interoperability of schemes 
if branches took additional coverage at the host country's scheme (topping up arrangement). Also different standards of 
robustness may be a factor affecting depositor confidence.  
Concerning the reimbursement of depositors, the activation of the DGS follows a declaration of unavailability of deposits by 
the Central Bank, the Banking Supervisory Authority or, in some specific cases, a competent Court. For preventive 
interventions (allowed in around 60% of the EU DGS), the same authorities are often involved in the procedure; however, for 
some DGS (around 33%) the scheme can decide autonomously when to intervene. Noticeably, most of the DGS (about 
78% of the DGS which have previously performed a reimbursement of depositors or intervened preventively) declared that 
no cooperation deficiency, which might slow down the efficiency of the process, had been encountered with the other 
authorities involved. 
The report also analysed the amount of available resources, both in terms of the funds collected by ex-ante DGS and via the 
investigation of extraordinary resources such as supplementary contributions and borrowings: an indicator for the 
robustness of schemes is proposed, measuring the percentage of members whose deposits are below the maximum 
amount of available resources. On average, DGS declared themselves capable of coping with a single crisis of any of the 
smallest 64% of their members without access to unlimited borrowing and 86% with recourse to unlimited borrowing, thus 
highlighting that at first sight, systems seem able to cover a reasonable proportion of their members. Values of the indicator 
without considering the possibility to borrow an unlimited amount of funds are extremely heterogeneous, and range from 0% 
in MT (i.e. no bank would be covered) to 95% in HU. Note that when allowing unlimited borrowing, the scheme features the 
“virtual ” capability  to cover intervention of any size. 
Concerning collected funds, 90% of the ex-ante DGS invest their money in national/EU bonds or in short term deposits. 
Only a few DGS declared that more risky investments are allowed, subject to constraints; for instance related to the rating of 
the underlying financial instruments. Besides collected funds, the great majority of the DGS are allowed to increase their 
annual fee and/or can call for additional resources such as extraordinary/supplementary contributions. Moreover, 21 MS 
DGS are allowed to ask for a loan, and in a great majority of EU countries there is no limit to the amount of money which 
can be borrowed  (only in 2 MS is a limit on borrowing set in the statute).  
The report has also presented some statistics on preceding payout delays, focusing on the time necessary to start/complete 
the procedure and on the percentage of deposits repaid within 3-6-9 months. Concentrating on the 3-month limit set in 
Directive 94/19/EC, data shows that, although the number of reimbursed claims is on average around 67% of the total, the 
amount repaid is higher than 92%, highlighting that globally, systems are quite efficient. Data on historical payouts 
emphasize that the option to extend the three-month period set in the Directive to complete the payout procedure has been 
exercised in only 25% of the occurred reimbursements. It is worthwhile noticing that in many MS the bankruptcy law allows 
depositors to claim their money over a longer time horizon, up to 5 years in many MS. Further analysis on the issue of 
payout delays is left to the EFDI Working Group. 
The final part of the Report was dedicated to designing and performing  scenario analysis intended at exploring the capacity 
of the EU DGS to cope with reimbursements of depositors and preventive interventions of  various sizes. In order to define 
the scenarios, a complete dataset on historical interventions was built.  
Between 1994 and 2006 a total of 45 reimbursements of depositors were registered across EU MS, 15 in the EU-15 and 30 
in the EU-12 (excluding 22 very peculiar reimbursements performed by the UK DGS in relation to the failure of very small 
Credit Unions, which cannot be considered as representative of the UK framework). Regarding preventive interventions, 
only 27 cases have occurred, all but one in the EU-15. A measure of the impact of the reimbursements/interventions, the 
“intensity ratio” (defined as 100 times the ratio of the total costs encountered over the total amount of eligible deposits), has 
been introduced in order to rank and classify historical DGS actions most of which involved small banks. Three classes of 
impact have been defined: high impact (intensity ratio higher than 0.5), medium impact (intensity ratio between 0.05 and 
0.5), and small impact (intensity ratio smaller than 0.05). Historical payouts are characterized by an intensity ratio ranging 
from 0.0005 to 3.24 (largest case, happened in SK in 2001) with a mean of about 0.27 and higher ratios being related to 
reimbursements occurring mostly in the EU-12. Concerning preventive interventions, intensity ratios vary between 0.0002 
and 0.73, the average being around 0.12.   
Three different scenarios representing a payout of depositors have been considered, one for each class of impact: a high-
impact scenario (Scenario 1) with an intensity ratio of 3.24; a medium-impact scenario (Scenario 2) with an intensity ratio of 
0.81; and a low-impact scenario (Scenario 3) with an intensity ratio of 0.035. Moreover, a fourth scenario (Scenario 4) based 
on the historical database of preventive interventions has been built, with a medium intensity ratio of 0.16. Since the original 
scope of the analysis included the assessment of the capacity of the EU MS to face a default of a bank with branches in 
another EU MS, a fictitious scenario (Scenario 5) has also been designed, describing the failure of a credit institution in one 
MS with branches in a second MS. The lack of data both on deposits of credit institutions in foreign branches and on past 
cross border failures has forced the design of a fictitious setting instead of a scenario based on historical data. For Scenario 
5 it has been hypothesized that the bank covers 3% of the market of deposits in its home-country; concerning the branch, it 
is assumed that it can be set in only one MS and that the share of the market for the host-country deposits accounted for by 
the branch varies between 0.1% (for a branch of a EU-12 country in one MS of the EU-15) and 2% (for a branch of a EU-15 
country in one MS of the EU-12). All possible pairs of home and host countries have been considered, so that the impact of 
Scenario 5 for each fixed MS resulted in a range of values, each in relation to a different host-country.  
The impact of each scenario on the EU MS has been estimated by comparing scenario costs with current available funds. 
For Scenario 1 (high impact) the costs vary from 0.14 to 61.85 b€: no scheme would be capable of paying out this sum 
without collecting additional contributions. Ex-ante schemes would have to gather on average 16 times their current funds to 
cover Scenario 1 costs. To better understand the impact of this scenario, as an example, note that for SE (the EU 15 MS 
with the highest coverage ratio) current contributions are around 1/30 of current available funds, thus stressing that under a 
failure of such magnitude the DGS would have to collect an enormous amount of resources to manage. Concerning ex-post 
schemes, the costs range from 0.4 (SI) to 35.32 b€ (UK), with an average of 13.18 b€. 
For Scenario 2 (medium impact), 7 MS (BG, EE, ES, LT, PT, RO, and SE) would have enough funds to cope with the 
reimbursement without the need to collect any additional contributions. Including all financial means available (ex-ante 
funds, ex-post contributions and additional borrowing, eventually unlimited), it would appear that 6 MS are not equipped to 
deal with a mid-sized failure. On average, ex-ante EU schemes would need around 4 times their present funds to tackle the 
payout. Excluding countries with a very low coverage ratio such as CY and MT, DGS would have to collect between 1 and 3 
times their current funds to handle the expenditures. Costs in this scenario lie between 0.035 and 15.49 b€, with an average 
of 2.18 b€.  
As expected, the impact of Scenario 3 is low, and all MS, except CY, not funded ex-post would be able to handle the crisis 
using current funds. Costs for ex-post DGS vary between 0.004 (SI) and 0.38 b€ (UK), the average being 0.14 b€, values 
which are lower than the average EU 2005 funds. 
Results for Scenario 4 (preventive) lie in between the ones of Scenario 2 (medium impact) and Scenario 3 (low impact). In 
particular, only three ex-ante MS (FR, CY, MT) would have to gather funds to  cope with the costs of such a preventive 
intervention. On average, ex-ante schemes would only use around 80% of their current funds to handle the expenditures of 
this preventive scenario (excluding CY and MT this value drops to 35%).  
The very high impact scenario, Scenario 5 has a much stronger effect than Scenario 1, with costs ranging from around 1 to 
almost 63 b€, the average being approximately 13 b€. Clearly, no EU MS would be able to face a crisis of this size without 
resorting to additional fundingEU-15 ex-ante schemes would have to collect between 5.5 (ES) to 44.26 (IE) times their 
current funds to handle the payout, with a mean of around 22 times. Excluding CY and MT, for the ex-ante EU-12 countries 
the amount of additional funds to be collected would have a lower spread of 7.25 (LT) to 24.72 (LV) times current funds. 
Results show that the consequences of such a Scenario might threaten the stability of the banking system of any EU MS.  
To summarize, comparing the impact of these scenarios with one another is rather difficult due to the variations in their 
definitions. For instance, average EU costs range from 0.09 b€ for the low-impact Scenario 3 to 8.69 b€ for the high-impact 
Scenario 1 and up to 13.67 b€ for the very high impact Scenario 5 (mean costs over host-countries). Comparing these 
amounts with the size of available funds implies that, in order to tackle the intervention, EU MS would need to collect, on 
average, between 4 times (medium-impact Scenario 2) and 50 times (mean costs very high impact Scenario 5) their current 
resources. Only for the low-impact Scenario 3 would all ex-ante DGS (excluding CY) have enough resources to cope with 
the associated costs. 
To complete the analysis, Scenarios’ costs have also been compared with the maximum amount of available money (either 
provided directly by the DGS or estimated using statutes/laws/bylaws). The comparison, which must be read with particular 
attention, simply aims at investigating the capability of the schemes to gather extra funds if necessary. Results show that, on 
average, DGS are capable of collecting nearly 3 times their current resources. However, in terms of impact, significant 
differences are only evident in a few MS.  
The overview of the US system highlights the main differences with the functioning of DGS in the EU. Quantitative 
information is not completely comparable, but an effort to present similar values has been performed: most relevant 
differences are given by the level of coverage (€80 379) and the size of the fund (around 39 b€), both higher in US.  
Regarding qualitative information on the efficiency of the scheme, the first significant difference is the role played by the 
FDIC, acting in general as receiver. The second crucial point is that the FDIC intervenes before the closure of the failing 
bank. Specifically, a process of deterioration of a member is defined to start when the ratio of tangible equity over assets is 
equal to or less than 2%. In this situation the FDIC starts its action and a pre-closing period of 90 days begins, where the 
scheme works on the resolution of the failure and organize the eventual reimbursement of depositors. These aspects result 
in an easy procedure of failure resolution, standardised rules of intervention, and prompt reimbursement of depositors. On 
the contrary, before EU schemes pay out depositors, they have to wait for the administrative or judicial declaration that bank 
cannot meet its obligations to depositors. Moreover, the interplay between national DGS laws and the bankruptcy laws could 
introduce delays  
Finally, Annex I is devoted to updating the scenario analysis, assessing the implications of changing the DGS funding 
mechanisms, performed in the 2007 Report. Compared to the situation depicted in the previous Report, no scheme in the 
last year has moved from an ex-ante to an ex-post system or vice versa, and none of the ex-ante schemes have adopted a 
new methodology for estimating their annual premiums. The same four scenarios (three ex-ante and one ex-post) have 
been explored, the ex-ante scenarios representing various EU countries and being characterized by different coverage 
ratios. The conclusions of the updated scenario analysis are aligned with the outcomes of the previous scenario analysis. 
Results confirm that the impact would be high for ex-post schemes: the total yearly contributions to be collected by these 
DGS would range between 0.3 to 2.4 (last Report 0.3 and 2.3) billion Euro, depending on the scenario. With minor 
exceptions, all variations with respect to the 2007 Report are attributable to the increase in the amount of eligible deposits or 
to the increase in the funds available. 
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